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iZusammenfassung
”Kinderkram” mag der erste Gedanke vieler sein, wenn es auf das Thema
Computer- und Videospiele kommt. Doch das Wachstum der Branche und ihre
Verkaufszahlen sprechen da eine ganz andere Sprache: Die weltweiten Umsa¨tze
haben la¨ngst zweistellige Milliardenbetra¨ge erreicht und von den Wachstum-
sraten ko¨nnen andere Branchen nur tra¨umen. Alleine in den USA wurden im
Jahr 2007 18,8 Milliarden US-Dollar mit Soft- und Hardware fu¨r Computer-
und Videospiele umgesetzt. Dies bedeutet eine Steigerung um vierzig Prozent
gegenu¨ber dem Vorjahr. Analysten sagen voraus, dass dieser Industriezweig in
absehbarer Zeit sogar die Umsatzzahlen der Musikindustrie u¨bertreffen wird.
Mit der zunehmenden Bedeutung der weltweiten Vernetzung u¨ber das In-
ternet steigt auch der Anteil sogenannter ”Online-Spiele”. Bei dieser Art von
Spielen ko¨nnen sich Teilnehmer, die u¨ber die ganze Welt verteilt sind, zum
gemeinsamen Spielen u¨ber das Internet miteinander verbinden. Auch die Zukun-
ftsaussichten solcher Online-Spiele sind gla¨nzend: bis 2011 soll der weltweite
Umsatz auf u¨ber 13 Milliarden US-Dollar ansteigen. Die kommerziell wohl
erfolgreichste Art von Online-Spielen sind die sogenannten ”Massively Multi-
player Online Games (MMOGs)”. Dieses Genre bietet riesige virtuelle Spiel-
welten, in denen tausende von Spielern gleichzeitig interagieren ko¨nnen. Dazu
erschaffen sie individuelle virtuelle Avatare, die in Anlehnung an reale Personen
Eigenschaften und Fa¨higkeiten entwickeln sowie Besitztu¨mer anha¨ufen ko¨nnen.
Die Spielwelten sind rund um die Uhr verfu¨gbar, ein Spieler kann sie jederzeit
mit einem Avatar betreten. Anders als bei anderen Spielgenres gibt es kein
vorgegebenes Ziel nach dessen Erreichen das Spiel zuende ist. Stattdessen ex-
istieren die virtuellen Welten oft u¨ber viele Jahre hinweg und binden somit die
Spieler langfristig. Der erfolgreichste Vertreter der MMOGs ist zur Zeit ”World
of Warcraft”, der Anfang 2008 u¨ber zehn Millionen Teilnehmer weltweit vor-
weisen konnte und damit einen Marktanteil von u¨ber 62 Prozent innehatte. Die
Teilnahme an diesen Spielen wird in der Regel u¨ber Abonnements realisiert, fu¨r
die monatliche Betra¨ge von bis zu 15 US-Dollar erhoben werden.
Die Entwicklung von heutigen Computer- und Videospielen ist eine komplexe
und kostenintensive Herausforderung. Im Jahr 2008 hat das erste Videospiel
die Grenze von 100 Millionen US-Dollar an Entwicklungskosten u¨berschritten.
Zusa¨tzlich mu¨ssen Anbieter von Online-Spielen die notwendige Infrastruktur
bereitstellen und betreiben, damit ein Spiel u¨ber das Internet gespielt wer-
den kann. Traditionell werden diese Spiele als Client/Server-Architektur re-
alisiert. Der Client dient dabei nur als eine Art Terminal, das die Spielwelt
audiovisuell darstellt und Kommandos des Spielers entgegennimmt um sie an
den Server zu schicken. Alle notwendigen Berechnungen um diese Kommandos
zu verarbeiten und den Zustand der Spielwelt zu verwalten werden auf dem
Server durchgefu¨hrt. Um hunderte oder gar tausende von Spielern in einer
Spielwelt unterzubringen sind leistungsfa¨hige Rechner und breitbandige Inter-
netverbindungen notwendig. Dazu kommt ein erheblicher Personalaufwand fu¨r
das Betreiben der Server, das Erstellen von Softwareupdates sowie Kundenser-
vice und Abonnementverwaltung. Beispielsweise liefen fu¨r World of Warcraft
seit dem Start im November 2004 rund 200 Millionen US-Dollar an Kosten an.
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Zusa¨tzlich zu dem Aufwand, den Betrieb eines Online-Spiels aufrecht zu er-
halten, kommt eine weitere Herausforderung hinzu: das Spiel frei von Betru¨gern,
sogenannten ”Cheatern” zu halten. Als Cheater bezeichnet man Spieler, die sich
unfaire Vorteile gegenu¨ber anderen Spielern verschaffen. Dies hat erheblichen
Einflußauf das Spielerlebnis ehrlicher Spieler und damit letztendlich auch auf
den kommerziellen Erfolg eines Spiels. Ehrliche Spieler werden durch Cheater
benachteiligt, was dazu fu¨hrt, dass sie ha¨ufig ihre Abonnements ku¨ndigen. Die
Betreiber von MMOGs gehen in der Regel hart gegen Cheater vor und zo¨gern
nicht diese sofort vom Spiel auszuschließen. Beispielsweise hat Blizzard Enter-
tainment, der Betreiber von World of Warcraft, im Jahr 2006 innerhalb eines
einzigen Monats 59.000 Spieler wegen Cheatings des Spiels verwiesen.
In dieser Arbeit stellen wir eine Netzwerkarchitektur fu¨r Online-Spiele vor,
die darauf abzielt, die Kosten fu¨r das Bereitstellen der notwendigen Dienste
erheblich zu senken. Dies geschieht, indem die beno¨tigte Rechenzeit und Band-
breite nicht mehr vom Server, sondern von den Clients, d.h. den Rechnern
der Spieler, bereitgestellt wird. In der Regel verfu¨gen Spieler u¨ber sehr leis-
tungsfa¨hige Hardware, die bei Online-Spielen bislang nicht voll ausgelastet wird,
da die Spielwelt vollsta¨ndig auf dem Server verwaltet wird. Weiterhin sind
Spieler ha¨ufig u¨ber breitbandige Verbindungen an das Internet angeschlossen.
Unsere Architektur nutzt diese Ressourcen indem sie die Verwaltung der Spiel-
welt auf die Clients verlagert. Zu diesem Zweck wird die Spielwelt in kleinere
Regionen, deren Verwaltung von einem einzelnen Spielerrechner bewa¨ltigt wer-
den kann, unterteilt. Ein Spieler, dessen Avatar sich in einer bestimmten Region
befindet, verbindet sich mit dem Rechner, der fu¨r die Verwaltung dieser Region
zusta¨ndig ist. Der Spielbetreiber muss nun nur noch Dienste bereitstellen, die
verha¨ltnisma¨ßig wenig Ressourcen in Anspruch nehmen. Zum einen wird ein Di-
enst beno¨tigt, der die Spielregionen den Clients zur Verwaltung zuweist. Dieser
Dienst kann gleichzeitig als Zutrittspunkt zum System fungieren, der jeden
Spieler zu dem Rechner weiterleitet, der gerade fu¨r seine Region zusta¨ndig ist.
Weiterhin sollte die Abonemmentverwaltung nur von einem vertrauenswu¨rdigen
Server durchgefu¨hrt werden, da hier sensible Daten gespeichert sind.
Die gerade beschriebene Netzwerkarchitekur wird in ein Framework inte-
griert, dass netzwerkspezifischen Programmcode vor dem Spielentwickler ver-
birgt. Das vermindert die Komplexita¨t des Entwicklungsprozess’ erheblich
und damit auch die verbundenen Kosten. Gleichzeitig wird die Wiederver-
wendbarkeit deutlich gesteigert. Die Abstraktion vom Netzwerk wird u¨ber
das Publish/Subscribe-Paradigma erreicht. Das Framework sorgt dafu¨r, dass
A¨nderungen des Spielstandes u¨ber eine Publikation automatisch zu den Rech-
nern verteilt werden, die an dieser A¨nderung interessiert sind. Auf diese
Weise wird der Zustand des Spiels auf allen Knoten konsistent gehalten, ohne
dass der Spielentwickler dazu manuell eingreifen muss. Das Framework ab-
strahiert aber nicht nur von der oben genannten Netwerkarchitektur. Prinzipiell
kann jede Architektur verwendet werden, solange die Kommunikation auf die
entsprechenden Subskriptionen und Publikationen abgebildet werden kann. Mo-
mentan unterstu¨tzen wir zusa¨tlich die traditionelle Client/Server-Architektur
und einen reinen Peer-to-Peer-Modus. Zusa¨tzlich zur Netzwerkabstraktion
beschleunigt das Framework den Entwicklungsprozess durch einen datenzen-
trierten Ansatz. Jeder Aspekt eines Spielobjekts — Zustand, Typ und Opera-
tionen — ko¨nnen aus einer externen Datei geladen und zur Laufzeit vera¨ndert
werden. Dadurch wird zeitaufwa¨ndiges Neukompilieren bei A¨nderungen am
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Spieldesign vermieden.
Weiterhin stellen wir eine Lo¨sung vor, die regelwidrige Vera¨nderungen am
Spielstand verhindert. Dieses Problem entsteht, wenn der Zustand des Spiels
nicht auf vertrauenswu¨rdigen Servern, sondern auf den Clients der Spieler ver-
waltet wird. Weil diese Clients prinzipiell nicht vertrauenswu¨rdig sind, ko¨nnen
wir uns nicht ohne weiteres auf deren Berechnungen verlassen. Anstatt einen
einzelnen Client u¨ber den Zustand einer Region entscheiden zu lassen, wird der
Zustand auf mehreren Clients repliziert. Jede Replik votiert nun fu¨r einen bes-
timmten Zustand des Spiels und die Mehrheit entscheidet. Solange die Mehrzahl
der Repliken sich regelkonform verha¨lt, ko¨nnen Manipulationen dadurch verhin-
dert werden. Der Abstimmungsprozess erfordert keine direkte Synchronisation
zwischen Repliken. Dadurch wird der Kommunikationsaufwand minimiert und
einzelne Repliken ko¨nnen den Entscheidungsprozess nicht blockieren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
”Video games are kids’ stuff” may be still in the minds of many people. But
the video games industry is far beyond its infancy and has already grown into
a multi-billion dollar business. The NPD Group reports [79] that in 2007 the
revenues generated in the U.S. with video game soft- and hardware for consoles
and personal computers reached a total of 18.8 billion dollars, a 40 percent
increase over 2006. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers [85], the global sales
will even surpass those of the music industry within the next years.
With the success of the Internet, online games are a constantly increasing
part of these sales. According to DFC Intelligence [32], the worldwide online
game market will grow to over 13 billion dollars in 2011. The probably most
successful online game genre today is that of the so-called Massively Multiplayer
Online Games (MMOGs). This kind of games provides vast virtual worlds,
where thousands of players can meet and interact simultaneously. Most of these
worlds are persistent, i.e. they may be online for years. They are hosted on
Internet servers which are online 24/7 and players can join and leave the game
whenever they like to. The persistence of the game world allows for long-term
development of virtual avatars with individual characteristics and possessions.
The leader of the MMOG market today is Blizzard Entertainment with the title
World of Warcraft [14]. In the beginning of 2008, World of Warcraft had 10
million subscribers (each paying up to 15 dollars per month) and a market share
of 62 percent [109].
Developing todays video games is a complex and cost-intensive task and
multiplayer online functionality has a significant share in this. In 2008, the first
video game hit the 100 million dollar mark [100] for development costs. In ad-
dition to that, publishers of online games need to provide the necessary services
to allow their customers to play the game over the Internet. Traditionally, most
online games and nearly all MMOGs are built relying on the Client/Server ar-
chitecture. The client software runs on the player’s computers and shows only
an audio-visual representation of the game world. It accepts commands issued
by the player and transmits them to the server. Processing the commands and
managing the state of the game is completely done on the server-side. Thus,
to be able to handle hundreds or thousands of players simultaneously, large
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amounts of computing power and network bandwidth are required. Addition-
ally, the service requires a large staff for server maintenance, software updates,
billing and customer services. In [62] it was revealed that the provision of the
World of Warcraft service did cost about 200 million dollars since its launch in
November 2004.
In addition to the effort of maintaining a multiplayer online game service
after its launch there arises another challenge: keeping the game free of cheaters.
A cheater may be defined as a user that performs an “action that gives an
advantage over his opponents that is considered unfair by the game developer”
[103]. One must be aware that cheating is a major concern in multiplayer games
as it seriously affects the game experience of honest players [76]. Especially for
subscription-based online games this is fatal, since customers will cancel their
subscriptions if the experience doesn’t meet their expectations. Game publishers
usually do not hesitate to close the accounts of players that they believe to
have cheated. For example, in 2006 Blizzard Entertainment announced in their
forums [80] that they have banned 59,000 players from World of Warcraft within
a single month.
1.2 Proposed Approach
This thesis proposes a network architecture for multiplayer online games that
aims at reducing the costs for providing online game services by shifting most
of the computational effort and the bandwidth requirements on to the cus-
tomers’ computers. In traditional Client/Server games the client acts merely as
a dumb terminal which shows an audiovisual representation of the game and
accepts input from the player. However, players of computer games tend to
be equipped with powerful hardware and usually access the Internet via broad-
band connections. Thus, many of the client-side resources remain unused. Our
architecture utilizes these resources by letting the player nodes carry out the
management of the game state. For this purpose, the game world is partitioned
into smaller sized regions which can be handled by a single player computer.
Those players, whose virtual avatars are located in a certain region, connect to
the corresponding node that manages the region. The game publisher has just
to provide servers for tasks that have comparably low resource requirements.
A central server is necessary to assign the region management tasks to player
nodes. It also serves as an entry point into the system so newly joined players
know which node is responsible for their region. Finally, the subscription man-
agement should only be performed by a trusted server since it handles sensitive
player data (e.g. credit card data).
The architecture mentioned above is integrated into a framework that tries to
hide the networking related code from a regular game developer. This reduces
the complexity of the development process and thus the corresponding costs
while at the same time enhances reusability. Network abstraction is achieved
by applying the Publish/Subscribe paradigm [37]. Our framework automatically
generates an update publication whenever the state of the game changes which
is routed to the nodes that need to be informed. This way, the game state
is kept consistent on all nodes of the network without the need for manual
intervention by the game developer. However, the pub/sub mechanism does
not only abstract from the above network architecture. In principle, any kind
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of network architecture may be used as long as the message passing can be
mapped onto the appropriate publications and subscriptions. We currently also
support the traditional Client/Server architecture as well as a pure Peer-to-Peer
one. In addition to the network abstraction, our framework tries to speed up
the development process by following a data-driven approach. This means that
all objects of the game’s state are completely dynamic. Every aspect of a game
object — state, type and operations — can be loaded from a configuration
file and changed during runtime. This way, time-consuming recompilations are
avoided whenever changes in the game object’s design occur.
Finally, we present a solution for preventing malicious manipulations of the
game state. This is a problem that arises from our proposed network architec-
ture: the game services are now provided by untrusted player nodes instead of
trusted servers run under the authority of the game publisher. Since it is not
feasible to establish full trust into player nodes, we must cope with the fact that
a certain fraction of the nodes may be malicious. Instead of letting a single
node being responsible for managing the state of a game region, we replicate a
region’s state on multiple nodes. Each replica votes for its state and the ma-
jority determines the correct one. As long as the majority of nodes is honest,
unfair manipulations can be prevented. Our voting procedure avoids a direct
synchronization between region replicas. This way, the messaging overhead is
reduced and single malicious nodes are not able to disturb the voting procedure.
1.3 Contributions of this Thesis
In this work we develop an easy-to-use framework for creating multiplayer online
games. The main benefits of this framework include the following aspects:
• Although the focus of the framework lies on multiplayer online games, the
framework is flexible enough to allow the creation of single player games
as well as local area multiplayer games.
• The framework allows to use different networking modes without changing
the code of the game. Currently, Client/Server, Peer-to-Peer and a hybrid
anti-cheating mode are supported. Custom modes can easily be integrated
with little effort.
• Game developers can focus on the actual design of the game without
worrying about networking or consistency issues. They can create and
manipulate game objects as if they were stored locally. Updates of game
objects are automatically disseminated to the interested nodes.
• The framework is modular so any custom or off-the-shelf components (e.g.
graphics, sound or physics engines) can be integrated.
• For realizing the Publish/Subscribe service that provides the network ab-
straction, custom implementations that are optimized for special require-
ments may be used.
• The framework easily integrates into a game developer’s workflow. All
game objects may be created and manipulated with specialized external
tools. The completely dynamic and data-driven object model allows to
import game objects on the fly without the need for recompiling code.
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• We present an example game that demonstrates that our framework can
actually be used for implementing real games.
We develop a distributed and cheat-resistant network architecture for online
multiplayer games. This architecture integrates seamlessly into our framework
and can be used as one of the many possible networking modes. The main
contributions are:
• We identify the cheating attacks relevant for distributed online games,
analyze their impact and point out the main concepts to counteract them.
• Based on these concepts, we develop a distributed gaming architecture
that addresses the most important issues like consistency, replica place-
ment and update propagation.
• We thoroughly analyze relevant attack scenarios and show how our system
deals with them.
Finally, to prove that our approach is feasible under realistic network conditions,
the proposed architecture underwent an evaluation. The evaluation included
• a mathematical model to estimate the probability that a voting failure
will occur because of network latencies and jitter.
• a comparison of the model to the results of a simulation. The simulation
covered all interactions of the participating network nodes.
• multiple realistic scenarios which all were based on real-life parameters
and included clock skew, node churn and node crashes.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of related
scientific work. We start with the general topic of distributed gaming. Next
we discuss papers in the more specific areas of network abstraction for online
games and addressing cheating. The overview shows that no previous research
has covered all issues addressed in this thesis.
In chapter 3 we discuss the design and implementation of our framework.
We start with giving a high-level overview and continue describing each
layer in detail. We show how network abstraction is achieved and explain
how the framework can be optimized for specific requirements. We conclude
this section with a description of an example game realized using our framework.
Chapter 4 presents the distributed network architecture that provides
appropriate countermeasures against cheating. We first give an introduction
into the taxonomy of cheating and explain which attacks are relevant for us. We
then discuss general principles to counterattack these attacks before going into
the details of our approach. The flow of information within our architecture
is described in detail and visualized by sequence diagrams. We conclude this
chapter with analyzing concrete attack scenario and discussions on how our
system deals with them.
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The architecture above is evaluated in chapter 5. For this we develop
an analytical model to predict the behavior of our system. This model is
compared to an implementation of our network architecture using a simulation
framework. For the comparison we examine five scenarios which are based on
real-life parameters and realistic network conditions.
Finally, in chapter 6, we give a summary of our work and discuss possible
directions of future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter we present an overview of the research that has been done in
the area. We start with publications that are related to the general topic of
distributed gaming. We then present work that has been done in the areas of
network abstraction and cheating prevention in online games.
2.1 Distributed Gaming
In this section we give an overview of research projects that distribute the
computational effort of managing a game among the nodes of the players. The
projects mentioned in this section do not address the problem of cheating at
all or declare it as future work.
MiMaze [66, 46, 45] labels itself to be a descendant of Amaze [8] and claims
to be the first 3D multiplayer game designed with a distributed architecture.
It follows some of the rules of the IEEE Standard for Distributed Interactive
Simulation [53, 54].
In MiMaze each client maintains its own local view of the global game state
using information received from other clients. A server is only needed when a
new client joins a session. The underlying transport protocol is RTP [90] over
UDP/IP multicast. Clients are synchronized via a mechanism called bucket
synchronization. Simulation time is divided into fixed length sampling periods
and a bucket is associated with each sampling period. Updates received by a
player that were issued during a certain period are gathered in the corresponding
bucket.
MiMaze has undergone a performance evaluation. It was performed with
25 clients on the Mbone [36], a virtual network on top of the Internet, that
allows for multicasting. The evaluation showed that although there was a
significant loss of updates (usually only about 70% of the update messages
were incorporated into the calculation of current game state) and therefore
inconsistencies, these losses had no visible impact on gameplay. This may
be due to the high update frequency (25 updates per second) which makes a
few lost updates not noticeable. Scalability seems to be a major problem in
MiMaze. The authors didn’t perform tests with more than 25 clients, but they
argue that every additional clients adds about 10 kilobit/second, so the Mbone
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will be saturated at about 50 clients.
Mercury was first introduced as a distributed content-based publish/sub-
scribe infrastructure for Internet multiplayer games [12]. It mainly addresses
the scalability issues of broadcast-based architectures like MiMaze. Broadcast-
ing updates to all clients leads to network flooding and therefore limits the num-
ber of players. Publish/subscribe systems deliver publications (in this context:
updates) only to clients which are interested in them, i.e. which have registered
an appropriate subscription. For example, a player may want to receive posi-
tion updates of other players only if they are within his line of vision. He would
consequently register for a position update subscription that is based on his
current location in the game. In Mercury a publication is composed of simple
pairs of typed attributes and values (e.g. the x- and y-coordinates of a players
position). A subscription is a conjunction of predicates over these values. If a
publication’s values evaluate a subscription’s predicate conjunction to ”true”,
the publication will be routed to the appropriate subscribers. For example, if a
player lingers in the region determined by the coordinates 100 < x < 200 and
400 < y < 500, he may receive all position updates within these boundaries.
The mercury infrastructure is divided into hubs, each consists of multiple
nodes and is responsible for a certain attribute. Any subscription will be sent to
a single hub, that is responsible for one of its attributes. The choice of the hub
has a significant impact on flooding because a publication will be sent to all hubs
that are responsible for one of its attributes. Inside a hub the nodes are arranged
logically as a circle, each node responsible for range of the attribute’s values.
Every node is connected to its predecessor and successor. A publication is passed
along the circle until it reaches the node whose range meets the attribute value.
Subscriptions on the other hand may be routed to multiple nodes because they
may match a range of attribute values. Eventually, a publication will reach
the nodes where the matching subscription is stored, the ”rendezvous” point.
These nodes will forward the publication to the subscribers. Because hubs are
organized as circles, a message that is sent to a hub with n nodes will pass
through n/2 nodes on average, causing a very high latency.
In [10] the focus of Mercury has changed to a system that supports
multi-attribute range queries. But a multiplayer game (called ”Caduceus”)
is still used as an example application. The routing has undergone further
optimizations, but latency is still very high.
SimMud [61] is a simple P2P massively multiplayer game. It is built on
top of the P2P overlay Pastry [88]. Like other overlays, Pastry provides the
functionality of a distributed hash table (DHT), by mapping a given object key
to a unique node in the network. Game state is disseminated using Scribe [20],
a multicast infrastructure built on top of Pastry. In SimMud the game world is
partitioned into fixed size regions. Players in the same region form an interest
group so that object updates that can be seen by all players in a region are
disseminated only within the group. Interactions between players are handled
by direct connections. Every object has a coordinator that has authority over
the object’s state and therefore enforces single-copy consistency. If any player
wants to manipulate the state of an object, he has to send an update to it’s
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coordinator. Although there is a single coordinator for every object’s state,
there can be any number of replicas. All updates to the object are send to the
coordinator as well as to the replicas. Whenever the coordinator fails, a replica
can take over its place and become the new coordinator. Experiments with
1000 and 4000 players respectively show that most messages take less than
six hops. Given a random delay between 3 and 100ms between nodes, most
messages are delivered in less than 200ms. The average bandwidth requirement
is 7.2KB/s, and peaks at 22.34KB/s. These figures show that the architecture
is suitable for multiplayer online games over consumer broadband connections.
SimMud declares cheating issues as future work. In its current version, the fact
that every client is the coordinator for its own player object makes arbitrary
manipulations possible.
Colyseus [11] is another P2P game architecture based on distributed hash
tables. The objects of the game world are distributed among the nodes of
the players. Each object has a single owner which serializes all operations
on a primary copy while other nodes may only keep cached replicas for local
access which are periodically updated. To speed up the updating process, the
DHT is only used for locating the primary object. After the owning node
of a game object is known, updates are propagated to the replicas using a
direct connection. One of Colyseus’ main features is a subsystem that allows
prefetching of game objects to reduce latencies. This prefetching is controlled
by the interest management system. Usually, a player node is only interested in
game objects that are in the interaction range of the player’s avatar. Colyseus
tries to discover the primary copies of objects before they get into this range.
This way, the delay until a local replica is available is hidden from the player.
The authors adapted the commercial first-person-shooter Quake 2 [52] and
showed that their architecture can handle even fast-paced games very well.The
authors declare cheating as future work. Currently, nodes can tamper with
primary copies they own, withhold updates of game objects or receive updates
of objects that should not be available to them.
Mediator [38] adopts a hybrid communication architecture for multiplayer
online games. In the peer node bootstrapping process, a structured P2P overlay
is used. The game world is split into zones and their structure is maintained
using an application layer multicast. Finally, time critical events are trans-
mitted over direct connections between peer nodes. The major contribution
of this work is that multiple super-peer roles (called mediators) are used to
perform the different management tasks of a multiplayer online game. The
boot mediator is the peer node that is closest to a zone in the P2P overlay and
handles the bootstrapping of new nodes. Distributed resource discovery and
interest management are performed by their own mediators. Zone mediators
are responsible for balancing out the workload among super-peers that manage
the game zones. The authors argue that the framework is extensible and new
mediator roles can easily be introduced according to additional requirements.
There also exist variations of common consistency models and implemen-
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tations more specific for distributed games. Rendezvous [25] is a decentralized
consistency management mechanism that is targeted at multiplayer games in
high latency environments. A key feature is that it always maintains a certain
degree of inconsistency in order to improve response time. Unfortunately, as will
be discussed in chapter 4, inconsistencies affect the correctness of our proposed
anti-cheating system and thus Rendezvous cannot be applied here. Mauve et
al. [70, 102, 69] propose a scheme that tries to hide short-term inconsistencies
which are caused by network delays. Updates performed on local game state
copies are delayed to compensate for the propagation delay to other replicas.
This way, the local player will perceive local changes with approximately the
same delay as remote players. However, global consistency among nodes is not
addressed.
2.2 Network Abstraction
In this section we present projects related to network abstraction in online
games. To our knowledge, no scientific or commercial work exists that deals
with the complete abstraction from different network architectures within a
gaming context.
Kaneda et al. [60] propose PeerBooster, a middleware that allows the
reuse of Client/Server-based games in a Peer-to-Peer mode. The authors argue
that this may be useful if the publisher of a game discontinues to provide
the necessary servers. A reason for this may be that the hosting becomes
uneconomical because players have lost interest in the game. This might
be the case with older games or games that were not very successful from
the beginning. Each player has to install an application on his node which
connects to the other player nodes in a P2P fashion. The application acts
as a fake server to the local game application by capturing and answering
the game related traffic. The global state is synchronized between all nodes,
making it appear as if all players were connected to the same server. A
major drawback of this approach is that the game’s network protocol must
either be openly specified or reverse-engineered. Every implementation of
this middleware is specific to a certain game and hardly reusable for other games.
Kosmos [4] is a simple game built upon a distributed server architecture
which is hidden behind a publish/subscribe abstraction. The game world is
split into segments and each segment is managed by a server. A focus of this
paper is to make the segments of the game world appear as a single seamless
world to the players. For this purpose, subscriptions to updates of player
avatars and game objects are automatically adjusted if these objects get close
to the borders of a segment or cross them. Consistency is enforced by a locking
mechanism which serializes access to all game objects. Since game regions are
always hosted on servers provided by the game publisher and not on untrusted
player clients, cheating is not an issue in this paper.
Another multiplayer online game architecture based on the pub/sub
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paradigm is proposed by Fiedler et al. [42]. Like the paper presented above,
they split the game world into distinct segments and subscriptions are chosen
according to the players position. Additionally, the game communication is
split into two different channels. The first channel is used for position updates,
while the second for interactions between players. The authors argue that
the second channel can be handled by the player nodes directly without the
engagement of a server. This way, the bandwidth demands on the server side
are reduced. The server only needs to receive position updates from the first
channel and these updates may be aggregated to save even more bandwidth.
Since player nodes handle the interaction between player avatars themselves,
cheating is possible. The authors declare dealing with this as future work.
The Real-Time Framework (RTF) [47] also aims at providing an abstraction
from the underlying network, but from a different perspective. It does not
address pure P2P or hybrid architectures. Instead, it abstracts from the way
a multiplayer game is distributed in a multi-server architecture. RTF supports
three distribution concepts, namely zoning, instancing and replication. Similar
to our framework, RTF provides a way for game developers to deal with game
objects without concerning about synchronization issues. The paper does not
go into detail about the underlying network architecture. Thus, it is currently
difficult to say in which parts our works complement each other.
Modern commercial game engines usually provide some level of network ab-
straction, but are mostly tied to a certain network architecture. The technology
overview of the latest Unreal 3 Engine [43] states that it is possible to run games
either in a Client/Server or P2P mode. Unfortunately, the architecture is not
openly documented and details thus unavailable. It is uncertain whether the
engine supports a transition from P2P to C/S or vice versa without altering
code. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the engine easily supports hybrid or
custom network architectures.
2.3 Cheating Prevention in Online Games
In this section we present projects related to cheat prevention in multiplayer
online games. Much of the work done in this area only addresses very specific
attacks for certain game genres which are not discussed in detail here. Instead,
we focus Projects that address the general problem of arbitrary game state
manipulations and discuss the differences to out approach.
FreeMMG [23, 22] is a hybrid between Peer-to-Peer and Client/Server
architecture and similar to our anti-cheating approach. While a server part is
responsible for managing subscriptions, authentication and storing backups of
the virtual world, the game itself is running in a distributed fashion on the
clients. The game world is split into segments and segments are replicated on
the nodes of the players. Unlike the system presented in this work, FreeMMG
stores a replica of a segment’s state on the node of the players within that
segment. This opens up the possibility of disclosing secret information directly
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to the players. The replicas use a lock-stepping synchronization mechanism
to keep the replicas consistent. This allows a single malicious node to block
the synchronization process indefinitely. Unfortunately, many aspects of the
system remain unclear. First, there is no systematic classification of attacks
with an explanation of how the system counteracts them. Only very few
cheating scenarios are considered briefly. It is also not clear how the correct
game state is determined in the presence of cheaters. Finally, the authors
haven’t found an appropriate consistency protocol yet. Although central parts
are missing, a prototype of the system has been implemented. How this imple-
mentation is supposed to function in the presence of these gaps is not explained.
Another hybrid system that claims to provide cheat resistance is published
in [26]. As in the system discussed above, the game world is split up into
smaller regions which are managed by player nodes. The assignment of regions
to nodes is realized through the Pastry [88] P2P overlay. Each region has
a master copy and several secondary replicas, following the primary backup
approach. The authors argue that because there exist multiple replicas of a
region, a manipulation of a region’s state cannot go unnoticed. However, they
do not explain how the correct state of a region can be determined among
probably conflicting replica states. As will be explained later in our work,
either a agreement or a voting procedure has to be performed to determine
the correct state. Generally, the paper stays on a very abstract level without
providing any details about consistency among replicas, attack scenarios and
appropriate countermeasures or latency issues incurred by the P2P overlay.
Trusted Computing (TC) is an initiative of the Trusted Computing Group
[97]. It offers two features that are of interest to online game publishers. First,
the possibility that only software that is signed by the publisher may run on a
TC enabled node. Second, the possibility that a TC enabled node can prove its
trustworthiness to other nodes of the system. The former guarantees that the
client software (and its state) cannot be manipulated, the latter enables game
publishers to identify trusted nodes over the Internet. As long as the game state
is only distributed among trusted nodes, no manipulations are possible.
As the public discussion shows, Trusted Computing comes along with many
dangers to the autonomy and privacy of the user. However, from an online game
publisher’s point of view, it seems to be an ideal solution, provided that the
security mechanisms are functional and cannot be circumvented. Players could
be encouraged to equip their Personal Computers with TC features by lowering
their subscription fees or offering them access to exclusive game content.
All modern video game console are already equipped with TC-like security
mechanisms. However, most of these mechanisms have been circumvented
shortly after the release of the consoles. Since then, the console manufacturers
have tried to fix security loopholes with updated firmwares until new ones
are found. This example clearly shows a major drawback of TC systems:
as soon as the security mechanisms is circumvented, all TC nodes become
untrusted since exploits are spread over the Internet very fast. Securing the
nodes again becomes a cat-and-mouse game between manufacturers and hackers.
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An interesting anti-cheating approach is presented in [75] which breaks up
with the assumption that a client is inherently not trustworthy. To ensure the
integrity of a client, a protection mechanism is embedded into the software. In
order to prevent an attacker from bypassing the protection, the protection code
will be constantly changed within short intervals. The client has to download
always the latest version of the code in order to be allowed to play. The authors
claim that breaking the protection within the small period when it is active is
not feasible. Since this approach is orthogonal to the system presented in this
work, they could be combined to provide a higher level of protection.
There are also many publications on other kind of attacks that are specific
to certain game genres or scenarios. We will only give a very brief overview.
Baughman et. al. [6, 7] propose a scheme that uses a lock-stepped commitment
protocol to prevent cheats on the protocol level. The NEO protocol [44] was
developed as an improvement to the one presented above. It addresses a broader
range of cheats while at the same time reduces latency but still addresses only
cheats on the protocol level. Another approach on a similar level is AC/DC
[41], which addresses cheats based on game event timing. Buro [18] presents a
server-based architecture which addresses a cheat popular in Real-Time Strat-
egy Games (RTS) that discloses the positions of enemy players. Chambers et
al. [24] show that this kind of attack can also be addressed in a Peer-to-Peer
architecture. Mogaki et al. [74] try to address the problem of delaying or deny-
ing the sending of game commands with a time-stamp service. Finally, RACS
[106, 104] is an anti-cheating scheme for hybrid architectures which only re-
duces the outgoing bandwidth requirements of the server but not the incoming
bandwidth and processing requirements.
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Chapter 3
Framework Architecture
3.1 Introduction
“Ten or twenty years ago it was all fun and games. Now it’s blood, sweat, and
code.”[15] In the early days, computer games could be developed by a only few
people or even a single person. Most of the work was about writing optimized
game code for hardware with very limited resources. Due to these resource lim-
itations, other aspects of a game, like design, graphics or sound, had to remain
very simple. Today’s games are multi-million dollar projects including dozens
of highly specialized professionals, like 3D artists, level designers, musicians or
storytellers.
Despite the fact that creative work makes up the largest fraction of a gaming
project today, it still remains a challenging software engineering effort. As in
all software engineering projects, reusability is one of the key issues which can
significantly lower complexity, production costs and time-to-market. Any game
uses at its core a central component, called the game engine, that handles all
the computational tasks necessary for a game. First of all, it manages all the
objects that show up in the game, like players, enemies and the game world
itself. It performs the necessary logic to make these game objects come alive,
like performing artificial intelligence for objects that represent living things or
physics for inanimate objects. The game engine receives commands that are
issued by human players (e.g. via mouse, keyboard or gamepads) that sit in
front of the computer and turns them into actions that are performed by the
game objects representing the players. Last but not least, the engine provides
an audio-visual real-time representation of the game. Many of these tasks can
be encapsulated in a separate component. This way, a component can easily be
replaced by a more specialized one or reused in different projects. Moreover,
the components can provide an abstraction from the underlying hardware, en-
abling games to run on different platforms. Nowadays, many game engines are
customized and reused by multiple game projects and selling engine licenses is
even part of the business model of some producers.
Besides providing essential technical components, the game engine serves
as an interface to incorporate all the digital content (called assets) created
by various artists into the game. Examples for assets are character and level
designs, 3D models and textures, sound effects and music or text and dialogs.
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Assets are created with specialized tools and later converted into a format that
can be imported by the game engine. Usually, most asset creators have a very
limited knowledge about writing code. Thus, the interface to the game engine
must require a minimum of programming skills. But at least when creating
assets that exhibit behavior (like an enemy whose behavior is determined by
an artificial intelligence) one usually cannot avoid getting in touch with coding.
For this purpose, easy-to-learn scripting languages are incorporated into the
game engine. Together with predefined methods, which handle common in-
game functionality (e.g. a move(x,y) method, which moves a game object to a
certain position and automatically performs path finding and collision detection)
and can be called from within a script, the programming task is kept as simple
as possible.
Hiding complexity gets even more difficult when network gaming comes into
play. Network functionality is probably the most important gaming feature
today, with networks ranging from a few nodes in a LAN environment to a
few thousand nodes in Massively Multiplayer Online Games. Providing a suf-
ficiently consistent view of the game on all nodes of the network is non-trivial.
Consequently, asset creators should not be burdened with the task of handling
inconsistencies or performing manual synchronization of game objects. How-
ever, even programmers that work on different engine components benefit from
being shielded from complex consistency issues. Thus, it is generally a good
idea to keep consistency-related code within a single module, allowing develop-
ers of other modules to focus on their specific tasks. Again, a clean separation
of concerns is a good basis for reusability.
In this chapter we present a framework for a game engine that, in addition
to providing support for the necessary components, completely shields game
developers from network and consistency related issues. Unlike existing game
engines, our system does not only abstract from a specific network architecture.
Games built using our framework can be deployed in many different environ-
ments by simply changing a configuration file. Besides running the game in
single player mode locally, we currently support three network modes: classic
Client/Server, a pure Peer-to-Peer mode usually known as Replicated Simula-
tion [9] and a P2P mode with special anti-cheating guarantees that is presented
in detail in the following chapter. In the following we will refer to these net-
work modes as CCS, RS and AC respectively. All three modes provide some
protection against cheating, an essential property for today’s games. The un-
derlying abstraction allows developers to extend the framework with their own
custom network modes, if necessary. Without the need to commit to a specific
network mode, it is much easier to reuse a game engine in different projects.
Furthermore, game developers may allow players of a certain game to change
the network mode by simply altering a configuration file. If a group of play-
ers doesn’t trust a single node to host a server for a Client/Server session, they
could switch to Peer-to-Peer mode where each node maintains its own local copy
of the game state. Finally, home-brewn or independent games as well as aca-
demic projects may benefit from the possibility of playing around with different
network modes without having to change their game code.
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Figure 3.1: High-level overview
3.2 Overview
Our proposed framework architecture can be divided into three layers and two
intermediate interfaces, as shown in Figure 3.1. The discussion in this section
remains on a rather abstract level; important details are addressed in the fol-
lowing sections. We start on the highest layer, the Game Layer, and work our
way down to the lowest one, the Network Layer.
3.2.1 Game Layer
The Game Layer is the place where most of the ”action” takes place. It contains
nearly all the important components of a game engine, like the input manager,
the presentation manager and the scheduler. The input manager is responsible
for accepting commands issued by the player via keyboard, mouse, a gamepad
or any other kind of input device. The presentation manager provides the
player with an audiovisual real-time representation of the game and probably
even some haptic feedback. At the core of any game engine there is a scheduler
which controls at which intervals the game world is updated and triggers certain
components of the engine.
Although virtually every game is made of components like those mentioned
above, actual implementations may show a great variety. Professional games
today will most likely consist of much more components, while simple games
may combine everything into a single one. Note that these components do not
necessarily have to be implemented by the game developers themselves. There
are many implementations that can be bought off the shelf or are available for
free.
Please refer to Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion of the Game Layer.
3.2.2 Object Interface
The central element of a game is a collection of objects that constitute the state
of the virtual world. The game objects may represent nearly every aspect of the
game: the players’ avatars, computer-controlled enemies or allies, interactive
objects (like vehicles and machines) or completely static objects (like trees and
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walls). Even purely logical entities that have no perceptible representation (at
least none that is perceived by a human player), like containers that aggregate
game objects into a logical unit or triggers that activate in-game actions, may be
modeled as game objects. The Object Interface allows the creation and deletion
of game objects as well as reading and changing their state.
In a multiplayer game, multiple participants share the same game world
and thus need to have a consistent view of its state. If the players are located
on different nodes of a network, local copies of the game objects, which as a
whole represent the state, need to be synchronized. The Object Interface hides
this synchronization effort completely, allowing a game developer to access and
manipulate game objects as if they were local. All components that run on on
the Game Layer may work as usual. E.g., the input manager translates input
events into appropriate changes of the player’s avatar object. The presentation
manager may read the state of the game objects and generate audio-visual and
haptic feedback. And last not least, the scheduler triggers updates of game
objects whenever the rules and the logic of the game require it.
Furthermore, the Object Interface provides methods that perform the nec-
essary bootstrapping when setting up or joining a network session as well as
methods to leave a network or shut down a session. Although these methods
are not directly related to game objects, they are included in the Object Inter-
face to provide a seamless abstraction to the game developer.
Note that the Object Interface is the lowest interface that a regular game
developer should get in touch with. Deciding in which network mode a game
runs is done via a configuration file, not by writing code. Only if the game uses
a custom network mode, code has to be written for the layers below.
3.2.3 Object Layer
The Object Layer is responsible for holding up the illusion that all game objects
seem to be local and can be manipulated through the Object Interface without
concerning about synchronization. Furthermore, it has to handle the necessary
bootstrapping when a new node joins the network or cleanup when a node leaves.
In our framework, every game object has an owner which keeps a master copy
of it. Whenever a node wants to change a local copy of an existing game object
it must send a request to the owner. If the request is granted, the owner changes
the object state accordingly and sends an update to every node that keeps a local
copy (including the one which has sent the request). Whenever a node receives
an update sent by the owner of an object, it will perform the contained change
on its local copy. This way we achieve a single-copy consistency since the owner
of an object serializes all operations on it. Note that in the AC example a group
of nodes acts as the common owner of a game object. Each node in the group
receives a request, processes it independently and sends an update. Whichever
node has a local copy will receive the updates and elect the one which holds the
majority. Please refer to chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
Note that all operations needed for the management of an object can be
mapped onto two types of messages, namely a request message and an update
message. We still need a third kind of message to inform nodes about organi-
zational events like the joining and leaving of nodes. Whenever a node joins
the network it sends an announcement to the existing nodes. Every node that
owns a game object which is relevant for the newly joined node may now send
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an update containing the current state of this object. This way, a new node can
be provided with the current state of the game. When the node leaves again, it
may inform the other nodes that it won’t process request or updates anymore. If
the objects it owns are still needed, it may request the creation of replacements
on remaining nodes.
Please refer to section 3.4 for a detailed discussion of the Object Layer.
3.2.4 Network Interface
The discussion above showed that the messages needed for game object synchro-
nization and node housekeeping may be divided into three categories: requests,
updates and announcements. What we have to make sure is that messages are
sent to the appropriate recipients. For instance, a client in the CCS example is
never interested in receiving request messages, since it doesn’t own any objects.
On the contrary, the server doesn’t care about updates since — due to the fact
that it owns all the objects — it is the only one to send them. To complicate
matters, nodes join and leave and thus the list of senders and recipients changes
dynamically.
However, this problem is not new and a solution for it is well-established:
the Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) paradigm [37]. One of the main advantages of
pub/sub systems is the decoupling of message senders from message receivers.
Participants of such a system only need to know what kind of messages they
want to send. They do not need to know who are actually the recipients of
these messages. The other way round, receivers only need to know what kind
of messages they are interested in, not who may actually be sending them. The
sending of messages of a certain kind is called a publication, while registering
interest for a certain kind is called a subscription. The pub/sub system matches
every publication to its respective subscriptions and thus takes care that a mes-
sage will reach its intended recipients. Both, publishers and subscribers, may
join and leave dynamically without requiring other participants to take notice
of this.
Applying this concept to our framework avoids that owners of game objects
and keepers of local copies have to be aware of each other. Any node which
wants to manipulate an object simply publishes an appropriate request mes-
sage. Owners of game objects are subscribed to this kind of message and thus
will automatically receive change requests. After processing the request, they
publish an update and nodes which keep a local copy will receive the change
since they are subscribed to update messages. To sum it up, the networking
interface has to provide methods to issue publications and register subscriptions.
3.2.5 Network Layer
The lowest layer of our framework’s architecture is responsible for implementing
the pub/sub methods that are offered by the network interface. Publications
have to be routed over the network to the appropriate subscribers. This layer
also has to take care of managing publishers and subscribers which dynamically
join and leave the network.
Please refer to section 3.5 for a detailed discussion of the Network Layer.
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Figure 3.2: Detailed overview
3.2.6 Concluding Overview
Figure 3.2 gives a more detailed overview of our three-layer framework includ-
ing its two interfaces. On top is the Game Layer which may access the lower
layers of our framework via the Object Interface. Within the Game Layer, one
may simply manipulate game objects as if they were local without paying at-
tention to the layers below. The only thing that may be noticeable is a delay
until a manipulation actually takes effect. (This delay may be hidden from the
player by using commonly known techniques like Dead Reckoning [82].) Below
the Object Interface is the Object Layer where the configuration of the desired
network mode takes place. A node has to define to which topics it publishes
and subscribes and which factory it uses for creating objects with the correct
ownership. Supporting custom network modes means providing the appropriate
definitions and factories. This layer is also responsible for handling the login
and logout of nodes. Finally, the Network Interface serves as an abstraction to
the message handling. By using a generic interface one may use different imple-
mentations in order to fulfill certain performance or scalability requirements or
simply to experiment.
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3.3 Game Layer
As mentioned in the section above, the Game Layer is the place where most
of the actual development takes place. Ideally, game developers will only get
in touch with the lower layers by using the Object Interface. Our framework
provides default implementations for the most important components, namely
the Scheduler, the Input Manger and the Presentation Manager, which will be
presented in the following.
3.3.1 Scheduler
The scheduler is the central component of any game engine. A game is basically
a real-time simulation and any of its objects and components must perform the
actions and operations at the correct point in time. In its most basic form, a
game engine scheduler is a simple loop that repeatedly reads input, updates
game objects and renders them to the screen. However, in modern games there
are many more tasks that need to be managed in a timely fashion, like dis-
seminating and receiving network updates or performing physical computations
for game objects. Moreover, the scheduler must make sure that a game runs
at the correct speed on machines with different processing capacities. In early
days, computer games repeatedly executed their main loop as fast as they could.
As long as the game was only played on a certain hardware, it always ran at
the same speed. However, with the success of the IBM PC and its successors,
it was more and more common that computers, which had basically the same
architecture and operating system, ran at different speeds. Thus, schedulers
now had to take into account the amount of real-time that passed between two
executions of the main loop. Another problem is that different passes of the
main loop may have different execution times. For example, when many objects
are currently visible on the screen, updating and rendering these objects may
take significantly longer than in a situation with only a few objects. Variable
execution times may result in a jerky gaming experience.
In order to support arbitrary tasks that can be put under the control of
the scheduler, an appropriate interface has been defined. Every component
that wants to be triggered by the scheduler implements the Task interface and
registers itself at the scheduler. The scheduler iterates over all registered tasks
and calls an update method which activates the task. The order in which the
tasks are activated during one pass of the main loop may be defined at task
registration time. In addition to the queue of tasks that are activated while
the game is running, there is a queue of tasks when the game is paused. This
is necessary, for example, to present a configuration menu while the game is
paused.
Whenever a task is activated, it receives the amount of time that has elapsed
since the last loop pass. This way, variable execution times of different passes
can be compensated. For instance, if the position of a moving game object
needs to be updated, the new position can be calculated by multiplying the
speed of the object with the time that has elapsed. As a result, the object will
move at a constant speed no matter how long a pass of a loop actually takes.
For determining the time that has elapsed since the last pass, a timer is used.
Our framework provides a default implementation that uses the standard JDK
timer, but it may easily be replaced with a custom high-precision timer.
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Figure 3.3: Scheduler Class Diagram
The framework provides some default tasks. The InputTask triggers the
polling of player input which may be translated into corresponding state changes
of the player’s avatar object (see section below). Informing active game objects
about the time that has elapsed, so they can update their state accordingly
(e.g. continue a movement), is performed by the UpdateTask. The NetworkTask
applies game object updates that are received from other nodes over the network
and sends updates of local objects to other nodes. Reading the state of all game
objects and rendering them onto the player’s display is done by the DisplayTask.
Finally, the WaitTask simply suspends the game thread for a certain time
which is useful if the game runs on very fast machines. Usually, the main loop
is executed consecutively without pausing. On very fast machines this leads to
a very high update rate of the game objects and the display. Up to a certain
degree, this results in a smoother presentation of the game. However, beyond a
certain point this is simply a waste of resources. Suspending the game thread
regularly leaves more processing resources for other processes running on the
machine or at least to less energy consumption while being in an idle mode.
3.3.2 Input Manager
The Input Manager is the component that is responsible for accepting commands
issued by the player and turning them into appropriate actions. Today there
exists a multitude of input devices: the keyboard, mice, gamepads, joysticks or
steering wheels. All these devices may provide input data in different formats.
Moreover, the same command may be issued by a player in various ways, so
some kind of abstraction is needed. For example, pressing the left arrow on the
keyboard, moving the mouse left or turning the wheel to the left will probably
all result in the same command: move the player to the left. In our framework,
commands are represented by InputEvent objects. For instance, an input event
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Figure 3.4: Input Manager Class Diagram
called “move player left” represents the above mentioned command, no matter
through which device it was issued. Moreover, a method can be defined for this
event that automatically changes the state of the corresponding player object.
The Input Manager allows arbitrary mappings between input data and input
events. The same command may be issued through different devices or multiple
commands may be issued by a single button press.
The actual hardware devices can be accessed through the InputHandler in-
terface. Our framework provides two implementations for this interface, namely
AWTInputHandler and JInputHandler. The former is an abstraction for the Ab-
stract Window Toolkit (AWT) which is the standard API for graphical user
interfaces in Java. The AWT allows reading player input — just keyboard and
mouse are supported — only through an event queue. Every time the player
generates input a corresponding event is generated and put into the queue.
However, for responsive gameplay, direct polling of the input devices is usu-
ally preferred. JInput is an external library that not only allows asynchronous
polling of input devices but also supports many more devices than the AWT.
Actually, all devices that are supported by the underlying operating system can
be used with JInput. However, JInput is partly written in native code and
thus runs only on supported platforms while AWT is available on all Java plat-
forms. The input handler interface provides an abstraction for polling input
data even if the underlying implementation only provides an input event queue.
The AWTInputHandler, for example, returns the most recent events of the queue
when pollInputs() is called.
3.3.3 Presentation Manager
The Presentation Manager is responsible for providing a real-time audiovisual
representation of the game. There exist plenty of commercial and open-source
engines for two- and three-dimensional graphics as well as sound engines. In this
work we only provide a very basic two-dimensional display manager without
sound. This is sufficient for the example game that we implemented using our
architecture and which is presented in section 3.6.
Our implementation provides methods for opening a display in windowed or
full-screen mode. It allows creating graphics that are managed by the graphics
hardware for optimal rendering speed. In addition to that, it uses double buffer-
ing for drawing display frames. This means that a new frame is always rendered
in an invisible back buffer. As soon as the rendering is finished, the currently
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visible frame (called the front buffer) is replaced by the back buffer which itself
is becomes the new back buffer onto which the next frame is rendered. This
way, the rendering of a frame is not visible to the player in front of the display.
If only one buffer is used for rendering, a disturbing flickering may be visible.
Since our simple implementation of the Presentation Manager fits into a
single class, we omit showing a class diagram.
3.4 Object Layer
The Object Layer offers a transparent access to all game objects disregarding
whether they are stored locally or on a remote node. It provides the necessary
implementation of the storage and retrieval methods offered by the Object In-
terface. Additionally, it implements methods for joining and leaving a network.
In this section we discuss the data model of the game objects, object man-
agement and how updates and ownership are handled. Next, we show how and
logging in and out of the system actually works. Finally, we give an overview
of the Object Layer’s architecture.
3.4.1 Game Object Model
The game object model has to meet two basic requirements: it must be flexible
enough to allow the modeling of arbitrary game objects and it must support the
creation of objects by means of specialized tools.
Many different ways exist to model objects within a virtual gaming environ-
ment [13, 27, 33, 35].We have chosen an approach that provides high flexibility
as well as ease of use. It is completely dynamic, i.e. every aspect of a game
object can be changed at runtime without the need for a recompilation.
The creation process of a game object is a very important issue. Game
engine programmers only provide the data model for the game objects; the task
of turning dull data structures into interesting objects that make up a fascinating
game world is performed by asset creators which are mainly artists. To come
alive, game objects need among other things detailed audiovisual representations
and realistic behavior. This has to be done without writing complicated program
code or time-consuming recompiling of object structures. Thus, game artists
need easy-to-use creation tools and a way to get a direct feedback of their
work. For this reason, the so-called data-driven development approach has been
established. Nearly all aspects of a game object are provided in a separate data
structure instead of hard-coding them into the software. These data structures
can be generated by specialized creation tools and imported into the game engine
without the need to recompile program code. This way, asset creators can see
the changes they made to the game objects nearly instantly reflected within
the game. This speeds up the development process and should make it easy to
integrate this framework into their workflow.
The game object model consists of four parts:
1. a game object type system,
2. the definition of game object attributes,
3. operations that can be performed on game objects and
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4. the relationship between game objects.
In the following, we describe each of these parts.
Type System
Every game object has an object type associated to it. In contrast to program-
ming language type systems, the focus of the game object type system is not on
providing features like type safety or polymorphism. Todays computer games
may have many thousand different kinds of game objects. A type system helps
to categorize these objects and bring them into a hierarchical order. This way,
complex object types can be derived from simpler ones. For example, at the root
of the hierarchy may be simple types that define whether an object is visible,
whether it can move or receive input from a player. From these basic type more
complex ones can be derived, e.g. a visible and moving avatar that can receive
input from a player. Game object types also provide an easy way to create
many objects of the same kind, e.g. an large army of uniform foot soldiers.
Of course, this functionality is also provided by type systems of common
object-oriented programming languages. However, experience has shown that
during the game development process the design of game objects may change
very frequently [33]. A static type hierarchy as offered by common programming
languages would force game developers to perform time-consuming recompila-
tion even for small changes. Moreover, asset creators would need to get in touch
with programming code since they had to change class hierarchies. For this rea-
son, the game object type system provided by our framework is completely
dynamic. A game object type keeps references to its base types, its attributes
and methods. These references can be changed dynamically during run-time
without the need for a recompilation. This way, an asset creator can directly
import any changes into a running test environment and see these changes re-
flected instantly. Moreover, changing game object types can be done through
the use of specialized tools. These tools may provide a graphical interface to
compose game objects and generate data structures that can be imported into
the game engine, thus following the data-driven approach.
Attributes
Every game object has a certain state attached to it that distinguishes it from
other instances of the same type. An object’s state is composed of its attributes,
which are themselves represented by state objects. Thus, a game object keeps
only references to its state objects which can be changed dynamically at any
time. Which attributes an object has, is determined by its type. On creation,
any game object is equipped with all the states that its type and all base types
define. The instantiation of game state objects can be done in a lazy manner.
As long as attributes of an object only contain the default value, a default state
object provided by the game object type can be used. Not until an attribute gets
a value assigned that differs from the default, it may create its own state object
instance. This way the memory footprint may be kept small and unnecessary
instantiation overhead is avoided.
A state object itself has an identifier which must be unique among the states
of a certain object type. By this identifier an attribute may be accessed, e.g.
by operations defined on the object. For example, a move(x,y,z) method may
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change the values of an object’s position attributes. The position attributes
may also be read by the presentation manager to render the object at the proper
position on the screen. Every state object has a value that contains the actual
state and corresponding getter and setter methods.
An important aspect is that a state object may inform attached listeners
about changes of its value. By default, a state object informs the game object
it belongs to whenever its value changes. The game object accumulates all
changes which can, for example, be sent as a whole over the network or written
to persistent storage. This way, resource-intensive polling for changes can be
avoided.
Operations
Every aspect of a game object can be represented by its attributes. Whenever an
object exhibits behavior, i.e. it ”does something”, this is reflected by a change
of its attributes. E.g. an object that moves changes its position attributes
constantly. Moreover, it may change certain flag attributes that provide hints
to other engine components. For example, a moving object may set a certain
flag to inform the presentation manager that it should render an appropriate
animation.
Performing operations on game objects could be done by simply changing
its attributes. However, it is tiresome to change the position of a moving object
constantly by hand. Instead, it would be convenient to simply set the desired
endpoint of a movement and let the finding of intermediate waypoints (including
path-finding to avoid obstacles) be handled automatically. For this reason,
operations can be defined on objects that abstract complex attribute change
patterns into single commands.
Of course, like types and attributes, operations should be dynamically linked
to a game object to enable the flexibility of a data-driven approach. For this
reason, operations are encapsulated into objects that are referenced by the corre-
sponding game object. The operation objects themselves represent small pieces
of code written in a scripting language. Since most scripting languages are
kept rather simple, they are ideal for asset creators that cannot avoid getting
in touch with coding. Simple scripts may be programmed by themselves while
more complex one can be provided by programmers. The scripting interface also
allows the use of different scripting languages, which may be tailored for certain
tasks like artificial intelligence or simulating physics. Since our framework is
implemented in Java, all scripting languages that implement the Java Scripting
API [71] may be used.
Game operations are defined by the game object type and a type inherits all
methods from its base types. Methods with the same name are overridden.
Relations
All objects of the game world form a hierarchical tree. Every game object thus
has a single parent and zero to many children. In most cases the hierarchy will
be ordered spatially. At the root is an object that represents the game world as
a whole, followed by subdivisions like regions or buildings and so on. However,
any ordering that fits the needs of a certain game design best may be chosen. In
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addition to the hierarchical ordering, it is possible to form game object groups
with regard to any criteria. This is described in the following section.
3.4.2 Object Storage and Retrieval
Since the game world may consist of thousands of game objects, a game engine
needs to provide efficient storage and retrieval methods. Some engine com-
ponents need to access game objects to change their state. For example, the
Input Manager translates commands issued by a player into changes of the cor-
responding avatar object. In a game that is played over the network, state
changes that are received from other nodes also need to be applied to the local
objects. Finally, many game objects will change their state over time, e.g. a
vehicle that follows a specific path changes its position constantly. Other com-
ponents need to read the state of game objects regularly. For example, the
Presentation Manager needs to read the state of game objects to create an au-
diovisual representation of the game. The networking component may need to
inform other nodes of the system about the changes of local game objects.
Object Manager
The Object Manager serves as a central repository for game objects. It allows
the insertion and retrieval of all objects of the game world. Every object has
a unique identifier under which it can be retrieved. Additionally, the manager
offers the possibility to search for objects or groups of objects using regular
expressions. For example, since objects are organized hierarchically, it is possible
to retrieve all objects that share the same prefix.
The Object Manager also provides access to the game object type system.
As explained above, game object types are represented as objects themselves
and can be retrieved by using their canonical names.
Finally, the manager offers convenience methods which are only used by
components located on the Object Layer. For example, game object updates re-
trieved from the network can automatically be applied to local objects. Further-
more, arbitrary observes can be attached to game objects to monitor changes.
Object Views
Although all objects of the game world are ordered hierarchically, in some cases
it is useful to form groups of objects according to other criteria. For example, a
physics component may want to know all objects that need accurate simulation
of physical properties. In the hierarchical order of the game world these objects
are not necessarily grouped together but may be spread all over the hierarchy.
For this reason it is possible to create game object views according to certain
criteria. A view can register itself as a game object observer at the object
manager. Whenever a new object is created or an existing one changes its
state, a listening view may add the object if it matches the view definition. The
same way, objects can be removed if they are deleted or do not match the view
criteria anymore. By using a view, any engine component can obtain a current
set of all game objects that are of interest to it.
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3.4.3 Updates and Ownership Management
As described above, game objects gather all changes that have been made to
them. These changes (also called deltas) are encapsulated in a separate object.
Not only changes to its attributes, but also the creation and deletion of whole
objects, is stored in a delta. The delta object provides serialization and deseri-
alization methods which make it easy to transmit changes to other nodes over
the network.
At this point, the ownership management comes into play. In a networked
game, only the owner of an object may allow changes to it. Whenever a change
is made to a game object, the framework automatically checks whether the
performing node of the change is also the owner of the object. If not, the game
object is not directly changed. Instead, a delta object is created that reflects the
desired changes and contains a special flag that marks it as a change request.
This request is transmitted to the actual owner node which may decide whether
it wants to perform the change or not. If it performs the change, an update
delta is automatically created in the usual way. This is a regular delta which is
not flagged as a request. It is transmitted to all nodes that need to be informed
about the change (including the node that sent the request). The receiving
nodes then update the object’s state accordingly.
Until now we have only talked about existing game objects which contain
the owner information in their metadata. What remains is the question of how
ownership is determined when creating a game object. Burdening a game de-
veloper with this task when creating an object would break our abstraction. To
avoid this, the object layer has to provide a factory method for each supported
network mode which encapsulates the knowledge about determining ownership.
A game developer simply creates an object (through the Object Interface) and,
depending on the network configuration, an appropriate factory is chosen. In
our CCS example, the server is the owner of all game objects and whenever a
client needs to create one, the respective object factory determines the server
as the owner of this object. In contrast, in the RS example a peer node always
takes ownership of objects it creates. Finally, in the AC mode, the owner id
addresses the whole group of owners. As we can see, a node does not only create
objects for itself but it may also request the creation on another node. Thus,
the creation of a new game object is treated the same way as the manipulation
or deletion of an existing one: it is sent as a request to the future owner. Upon
receiving and processing a creation request, the owner sends an update to all
nodes the creation may concern.
3.4.4 Login and Logout
Logging in and out of the system is straightforward: the other nodes of the
system must be informed about the joining or leaving of the local node. For
this purpose, an appropriate announcement has to be published on the network.
How this is done is explained in detail in section 3.5.1.
3.4.5 Class Diagram
Figure 3.5 shows an UML class diagram containing the most important classes.
At the center is the GameObject class. Every game object has a parent object
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and an arbitrary number of children, thus forming a hierarchical order. Ev-
ery game object is composed of one to many GameObjectState objects which
constitute the attributes of a game object. The game object is registered as a
GameObjectStateListener which gets informed every time an attribute is changed.
All changes are accumulated in a GameObjectDelta object which can be serialized
and deserialized for easy transmission over the network. Every game object has
a GameObjectType associated to it that contains all attributes of the type and
its default values. Moreover, the type references the script objects that make
up the operations that can be performed on game objects of this type. Finally,
each type may have an arbitrary number of base types which it is composed of.
Each game object may have a GameForm associated to it which is responsible
for rendering it to the screen (if the object is visible). The ObjectManager is
the actual implementation of the Object Interface and acts as a facade to the
classes of the Object Layer.
Figure 3.5: Object Layer Class Diagram
3.5 Network Layer
The lowest layer is responsible for distributing updates of local objects or sending
change requests for objects that are owned by other nodes. Additionally, it sends
announcements of nodes that join or leave the system.
We start with an explanation of how the underlying publish/subscribe sys-
tem handles the dissemination of messages mentioned above. Next, we shortly
discuss possible optimizations by using different flavors of pub/sub. Finally, we
give a short overview of the involved classes.
3.5.1 Publish/Subscribe
To demonstrate how a pub/sub messaging service can be integrated into our
framework we have chosen a simple form of pub/sub, a topic-based approach.
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Later on we will discuss how more powerful approaches may be used to lower
bandwidth consumption or improve scalability.
As the name implies, in a topic-based pub/sub system participants publish
and subscribe to topics and each topic represents a certain kind of message.
The obvious way to model our communication is to assign each type of message
— requests, updates and announcements— its own topic. We first demonstrate
how requesting a change and sending an update works within the three example
network modes we have implemented. Next, we will show how the announce
topic may be used for handling nodes joining and leaving the network.
The following is a short overview of how these network modes distribute the
ownership of game objects.
Classic Client/Server (CCS) The central server is the owner of all objects
and thus keeps all master copies. Clients only store local copies which are
updated by the server.
Replicated Simulation (RS) Each peer may own certain objects for which
it keeps the master copies. It stores local copies of the objects owned by
other peers.
Anti-Cheating (AC) In order to avoid arbitrary manipulations by malicious
nodes, each object is owned by multiple owners called Region Controllers
(RCs) (see next chapter for a detailed discussion on this mode). Thus,
each RC keeps its own master copy of an object and any change request
has to be sent to each RC. After changing the state of a master copy, each
RC sends an update to the local copies on the clients. The client compares
the update messages and elects the one that holds the majority.
Figure 3.6 shows the request/update process in the CCS context. Client 1
wants to change an object and publishes a message to the request topic. The
server which owns all objects has subscribed to this topic and thus receives all
requests. After performing the requested changes the server publishes a message
containing the changes to the update topic. All clients, including the one that
has sent the request, are subscribed to this topic and receive the update.
Figure 3.6: Request/update in CCS mode
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In the RS context (Figure 3.7), a peer that wants to change an object pub-
lishes a request. All peers within the system are subscribed to the request topic,
but only the owner of that object needs to process the request. The state update
is then published and received by all peers, since each of them is subscribed to
the update topic. A special case is when a peer wants to change an object that
Figure 3.7: Request/update in RS mode
it owns. In this case the peer may directly send an update to the other peers
(figure 3.8).
Figure 3.8: Request/update in RS mode (updating peer is the object’s owner)
Our last example, the AC context (Figure 3.9), is very similar to the CCS
mode. Instead of having a single server, all RCs are subscribed to the request
topic. After performing the requested change, each RC publishes an update.
The clients, which are subscribed to the update topic, receive all updates from
the RCs. Before an update will be performed, the correct one is elected out of
the received updates.
To handle events like nodes logging in and out of the system, a third topic,
called announce, is used. Whenever a new player joins the game, an object has
to be created that represents that player. The nodes already in the system need
to be informed about the state of this new player object. Figure 3.10 illustrates
this process in the CCS context. The server, which is subscribed to the announce
topic, receives a login announcement published by the new client. It creates a
new avatar object representing that player and publishes an appropriate update.
This update is received by all clients, since they are subscribed to the update
topic. The AC mode (figure 3.11) is very similar, the only difference is that all
Region Controllers have to vote for the creation of the player object and send
an appropriate update.
After logging in, the new client needs to be supplied with the current state
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Figure 3.9: Request/update in AC mode
Figure 3.10: Client login in CCS mode
of the game. For this purpose, every node that owns game objects must be
subscribed to the announce topic. Upon receiving the login message, the owners
may publish an update containing the complete state of their master copies.
Figure 3.12 shows this for the RS scenario. All peers that own local objects
have to inform the new peer about the state of the already existing objects.
Unfortunately, publishing the whole state of all master copies every time a node
joins the game would be a waste of bandwidth. Every node subscribed to the
update topic would receive the current state, even if its local copy is up-to-date.
Optimizations that avoid this are discussed in the following subsection.
If a node wants to leave the network it simply publishes a log-out announce-
ment. In CCS mode, after receiving this message, the server publishes an update
that removes the avatar object of the corresponding player from the game. The
same update is published by the Region Controllers in the AC mode. In the RS
mode things are slightly more complex, since a leaving peer node may be itself
the owner of certain game objects which are still needed. Before leaving the
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Figure 3.11: Client login in AC mode
Figure 3.12: Peer login in RS mode
network, the node has to make sure that these objects are transferred to other
peers. In order to do so, it can request the creation of an object on another peer
by specifying this peer’s id as the owner id.
3.5.2 Optimizations
An important way to reduce network bandwidth requirements in online games
is to restrict the amount of updates a certain node receives. Obviously, a node
does not need to be informed about changes of game objects that the local player
can neither perceive nor interact with in any way. Limiting the update message
to ones relevant for the player is commonly known as Interest Management.
Instead of subscribing to all messages that are published to the update topic, a
filtering based on the in-game position of objects may be performed.
For example, the Java Message Service [95] combines a topic-based pub/sub
approach with filtering based on key/value pairs. Every update published may
be enriched with additional properties that contain the position of the updated
object. Only when the player’s avatar is in the interaction range of that object
the update will be sent to that player’s node.
Instead of using a flat topic space, a hierarchical one may be employed to
restrict messages to certain game regions. This approach is usually referred to
as subject-based filtering [81]. E.g. in a game that uses a real-world setting, sub-
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jects like Earth, Earth.Europe and Earth.Europe.Germany could exist. Whenever
an avatar enters a region (e.g. Germany) the node subscribes to the correspond-
ing subjects. On the one hand, this makes sure that the node won’t be bothered
with unrelated messages of events that happen in a different country or even
on a different continent. On the other hand, the node will receive messages
of events that are relevant for the whole continent or even globally. Naturally,
changes made by the node will be published to the appropriate subjects in the
same manner, depending on their relevance.
Not only the addressing model but also the implementation of a specific
model has an impact on performance and scalability. One very important per-
formance criteria of network games is the latency when propagating updates of
game objects. Usually nodes of gaming networks talk directly to each other, be
it a client talking to a server or peers talking to each other. The delay of chang-
ing an object (i.e. issuing a request and getting a reply) equals the roundtrip
time between nodes. In an implementation that wants to avoid higher latencies,
a node that requests the change of an object must send the request directly
to the owner node. Afterwards, the owner has to send its updates directly
to all nodes which keep a local copy of the updated object. This way, extra
delay caused by additional hops on the network path is avoided. In such an
implementation a local software component running on each node can provide
the pub/sub interface to the object layer. Internally, this component stores a
list of all subscriber nodes for all topics it publishes messages to. Whenever a
node publishes a message it can send it directly to the appropriate nodes. The
subscription management service may be located on a separate node. Every
time a node subscribes for a topic, the management service can inform the pub-
lishers about it. By sending a so called advertisement, a node can inform the
management service about its intention to act as a publisher for a certain topic.
A further optimization is that whenever a node wants to change a game
object that it owns, it may directly publish an update without the need to send
a request first. But one should be aware that this may affect fairness. While
the change is propagated to other nodes with the delay of a single hop it is
perceived nearly instantly on the local node. This may enable the local player
to react much faster than players on remote nodes. To avoid this, an artificial
delay may be introduced (e.g. Local Lag [70]).
While the implementation above minimizes latency caused by network de-
lays, it severely limits scalability. Think of a node in a Replicated Simulation
which has to send updates to a very large amount of other nodes in the game.
This way a node will soon reach the limits of its network connection, especially
when using an asynchronous DSL connection with a very limited upload band-
width. This is where pub/sub systems that rely on intermediate brokers play
out their strength. While introducing additional delays for message delivery,
the intelligent routing and filtering mechanisms can minimize bandwidth and
connectivity requirements on the game nodes.
3.5.3 Class Diagram
Figure 3.13 shows an UML class diagram containing the most important classes.
Since we only provide a basic implementation which is rather straightforward,
we don’t go into much detail. The Comm class provides the implementation of
the Network Interface and acts as a facade to the network subsystem. It has
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a unique identifier which can be used as the ownership information for game
objects. The class provides appropriate methods for publishing messages and
to subscribe to message topics.
In order to get informed about incoming messages for a certain topic, a Sub-
scriptionHandler object has to be registered. Whenever an appropriate message
arrives, it is passed to the handle() method of the corresponding handler. Our
implementation provides the needed handlers for the three topics request, up-
date and announce. Depending on the network mode for which the system is
configured, the appropriate handlers are chosen. Currently, our implementation
supports the three network modes discussed in this chapter. The actual sending
over the network is performed by a NIOServer. This class is a network server
implementation based on the Java New I/O (NIO) system. Java NIO provides
non-blocking network connections based on connection multiplexing with selec-
tors. Instead of spawning a thread for each network connection, a single thread
uses a selector to iterate over all connections and check whether they are ready
for reading or writing. Because NIO is able to use native I/O operations of
the underlying operating system directly and can handle multiple connections
within a single thread, it is very efficient and scalable.
For each connection, the NIO server instantiates a MessageProcessor object.
This object reads incoming data when its available and reassembles it into mes-
sages. Whenever a message has been completely received, it is put into a queue
which can be accessed by the server. Outgoing messages are also put into a
queue and whenever the connection is ready for writing, the messages in the
queue are transferred.
Figure 3.13: Network Layer Class Diagram
3.6 Example Game Implementation
For demonstrating the feasibility of our approach, we implemented a game that
includes many important aspects found in today’s games. These aspects in-
clude a graphical representation, changes in object state through player input
or progress of time and interaction between game objects. While in our example
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Figure 3.14: Example game
they remain very basic, our framework imposes no limits onto their implemen-
tation. For example, rich three-dimensional graphics and sound are possible as
well as control of game objects through complex artificial intelligence.
In this section we will give a short introduction on how to develop games
using the framework by means of this example game. Our game is a simplified
version of a famous multiplayer game concept that has been implemented by the
open-source game XBlast [16]. Every player controls an avatar which may move
freely around the game field. By pressing a button, he can place a bomb at
his current location. Placing the bomb starts a timed detonator and when the
countdown reaches zero the bomb explodes. All avatars that are in the vicinity
of the detonation are removed from the field and, as in the original XBlast game,
the last remaining player wins. Figure 3.14 shows a screenshot of the game.
The starting point for implementing a game is a framework class that we
haven’t introduced yet, the class GameNode. This is merely a convenience class
that keeps references to the ObjectManager, which is the implementation of the
Object Interface, and the Comm object. In addition to that, it performs the
necessary initialization, i.e. read the network mode from a configuration file and
sets up the appropriate object factories as well as the necessary subscriptions.
The generic GameNode class is extended by the game-specific class BomberN-
ode. Here we add the Presentation Manager, the Input Manager and the Sched-
uler. First this class initializes a display for the game, either a regular or a
full-screen window. Next, it configures the input system either with an AWT
or a JInput handler and defines the appropriate mappings, e.g. the up arrow on
the keyboard is mapped to a “MovePlayerUp” input event. Then the necessary
tasks are registered to the scheduler, for instance tasks that read input from the
player, update the display and update game objects. Finally, it requests the
creation of an avatar object for the local player and starts the scheduler.
In the game there exist two types of objects: player avatars and bombs.
The avatars may move around freely and drop a bomb at their current location
by pressing a button. As soon as a bomb is placed, it starts a countdown.
When the countdown reaches zero, the bomb explodes and all players in its
vicinity are removed from the game. All game object types are defined in an
external file. The type definition is currently written in XML, but by providing
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an appropriate import plug-in, any data format may be used.
Figure 3.15 shows how a such XML type definition may look like. Lines 3 to
8 show the type definition of a player object. A player has a two-dimensional
position represented by the x and y states. The state facing shows in which
direction the player avatar is facing. Since the player type only stores the current
position, the flag moving shows whether the player is currently performing a
movement or stands still (alternatively, we could use a speed vector). Both, the
facing and the moving states, are used by the rendering system to determine
which animation frames to draw. Whenever a player generates an input event,
the states of the corresponding object gets updated accordingly. The lines 10
to 49 show the type definition of a bomb object. Like a player object, it has
a two-dimensional position. Additionally, countdown contains the detonation
timer and accumulatedMillis is used for accumulating milliseconds, as will be
explained below. Lines 16 to 30 contain the update method which is regularly
called by the update task registered at the scheduler. This method, which is only
called by the node owning the object, allows to trigger time-dependent behavior
like decrementing the internal counter of the bomb. Note that the scripting
engine allows to pass references to any script. In our example, TIMEPASSED
contains the amount of milliseconds that have passed since the last call of the
update method. On each call of the update method, the elapsed milliseconds
are accumulated. If the value is larger or equal to a thousand, one second or
more has passed. In this case the detonation counter is decreased by one and a
second is deducted from the accumulated time. When the detonation counter
reaches zero, the explode method is called. The explode script first creates an
iterator over all existing player objects. For this purpose, it uses a reference to
the Object Manager to search for all objects that have an identifier starting with
the string “player”. It then iterates over all player objects and, if the position
of the player is within a certain range of the bomb, removes the player object
from the game. Finally, the bomb removes itself.
As mentioned above, the network mode is specified in a configuration file. In
addition to that, we need to provide an information where a node can connect
to the network. If we use a Client/Server configuration, every client needs the
address of the server. In case of the Anti-Cheating mode, every client needs all
addresses of the Region Controllers. In the Replicated Simulation configuration,
we need the address of a node that serves as a log-in point to the system.
3.7 Case Study: Integrating BubbleStorm
In section 3.5 we describe how the pub/sub paradigm is used to abstract from a
specific network system. We claim that any system that provides this abstrac-
tion can actually be used with our framework. To substantiate this claim, we
used the Peer-to-Peer network BubbleStorm [98, 99], extended it with a pub/sub
interface and integrated it into our system.
BubbleStorm is an unstructured decentralized Peer-to-Peer system, that has
some interesting characteristics. It provides an exhaustive search mechanism
with probabilistic guarantees. A query is evaluated at the peer that received it,
so any kind of query evaluator may be used. BubbleStorm is fast and scalable,
in a network with a million nodes a search takes usually less than a second. It
exploits the heterogeneity of the nodes’ bandwidth to improve its performance,
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1 <types>
2
3 <type id=”p layer”>
4 <s t a t e name=”x” d e f a u l t =”0”/>
5 <s t a t e name=”y” d e f a u l t =”0”/>
6 <s t a t e name=”f a c i n g ” d e f a u l t=”south”/>
7 <s t a t e name=”moving” d e f a u l t=” f a l s e ”/>
8 </type>
9
10 <type id=”bomb”>
11 <s t a t e name=”x” d e f a u l t =”0”/>
12 <s t a t e name=”y” d e f a u l t =”0”/>
13 <s t a t e name=”accumulatedMi l l i s ” d e f a u l t =”0”/>
14 <s t a t e name=”countdown” d e f a u l t =”5”/>
15
16 <s c r i p t name=”update” lang=” j s ”>
17 < ! [CDATA[
18 accumulatedMi l l i s += TIMEPASSED;
19 i f ( accumulatedMi l l i s >= 1000)
20 {
21 countdown −= 1 ;
22 accumulatedMi l l i s −= 1000 ;
23 }
24 i f ( countdown == 0)
25 {
26 t h i s . execute (” explode ” ) ;
27 }
28 ]]>
29 </s c r i p t>
30
31 <s c r i p t name=”explode ” lang=” j s ”>
32 < ! [CDATA[
33 p l a y e r I t e r a t o r = MANAGER. search ( ’/ p laye r . ∗ ’ ) . i t e r a t o r ( ) ;
34
35 whi l e ( p l a y e r I t e r a t o r . hasNext ( ) )
36 {
37 p laye r = p l a y e r I t e r a t o r . next ( ) ;
38 playerX = player . g e tS ta t e ( ’ x ’ ) ;
39 playerY = player . g e tS ta t e ( ’ y ’ ) ;
40 i f ( ( ( playerX > ( x − 50)) && ( playerX < ( x + 5 0 ) ) ) &&
41 ( ( playerY > ( y − 50)) && ( playerY < ( y + 5 0 ) ) ) )
42 {
43 MANAGER. remove ( p laye r ) ;
44 }
45 }
46 MANAGER. remove ( t h i s ) ;
47 ]]>
48 </s c r i p t>
49 </type>
50
51 </types>
Figure 3.15: Example of a game object type definition
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Figure 3.16: Intersecting query and data bubbles in a BubbleStorm network
provides load-balancing that avoids hotspots and is very robust against churn
and crashes. BubbleStorm has not been developed with games in mind and thus
may not provide optimal performance for this purpose. However, the authors
are currently investigating online multiplayer games as a possible use case.
On an abstract level, BubbleStorm is very simple. It replicates both, data
and queries, on a certain amount of nodes. The set of all nodes that store a
replica of a certain data item or query is called a bubble. The intersection of
a query bubble and a corresponding data item bubble is the set of nodes that
are able to answer the query successfully. In a network with n nodes where a
query is replicated q times and a data item is replicated d times, the chance
of successfully matching a query is greater than 1 − e−qd/n. For example, if
qd = 4n, the chance of matching a query is greater than 98 percent. Figure 3.16
shows a simplified view of a BubbleStorm network. Nodes marked with a ”q”
replicate a query, while those marked with a ”d” replicate the corresponding
data item. The nodes which replicate both are able to successfully answer the
query and are marked with an ”m”. Note that the figure does not reflect realistic
ratios between the number of nodes in each set.
Realizing a publish/subscribe abstraction on top of BubbleStorm is rather
straightforward. A node that wants to register a subscription stores it into
the network. The system creates a corresponding bubble and replicates the
subscription on all nodes of this bubble. Figure 3.17(a) shows this process.
The node marked with a capital ”S” registers a subscription which contains
the subscription definition (e.g. a channel name for channel-based pub/sub)
and the address of the subscriber. This subscription is replicated on all nodes
of the corresponding bubble (marked with a lowercase ”s”). A publication is
replicated the same way as a subscription (see figure 3.17(b)). Each node of
the publication bubble checks whether it stores a subscription matching the
received publication. Nodes that are in the intersection of both bubbles forward
the publication directly to the subscriber using the address stored within the
subscription (figure 3.17(c)). Note that a subscriber may receive a publication
multiple times. Nodes that receive a publication matching a locally stored
subscription cannot know which subscribers already received this publication.
After implementing a pub/sub interface, BubbleStorm can be used by our
framework as described in section 3.5.1. In principle, it is possible to run a
game in any networking mode. However, using the Classic Client/Server net-
working mode together with the BubbleStorm network would be pointless since
this way we do not utilize any of the system’s advantages. On the contrary,
BubbleStorm seems to be well suited for large scale multiplayer games running
in the Replicated Simulation and Anti-Cheating modes. The scalability as well
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(a) Creating a subscription bubble
(b) Creating a publication bubble
(c) Rendezvous nodes send publication to subscriber
Figure 3.17: Publish/Subscribe on top of BubbleStorm
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as bandwidth consumption and message latency for networks in the order of
millions of nodes outperforms other systems. Since any query evaluator may be
used, more powerful pub/sub approaches than the simple channel-based one may
be applied. As mentioned above, further research on optimizing BubbleStorm
for the needs of multiplayer online games is planned for the near future.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a framework that provides a game developer
with a complete abstraction from network related issues. The framework can
be divided into three layers: on the highest level the game layer, underneath
the object layer and at the bottom the network layer.
On the game layer, standard components, like the game engine and compo-
nents managing audiovisual feedback and player input, are located. This is also
where a game developer has to implement the rules and the logic of a specific
game. All components on this layer communicate through an interface with
the layer below, the object layer. Game developers can create, manipulate and
delete all game objects as if they were local; network consistency as well as
ownership management are handled automatically. The networking interface
below hides network related issues behind a publish/subscribe abstraction. If
it is necessary to optimize the network layer for different quality requirements,
like higher scalability or lower latency, custom implementations can be used.
With network implementation details hidden, game developers can focus
more on game design rather than writing specialized code. Implementation
details like data-driven game objects further emphasize this approach.
3.8.1 Performance Impact
In some cases, additional layers of indirection may cause a significant degrada-
tion of performance. Since our framework adds two layers of abstraction, we will
have a closer look on this issue. The upper layer, which is visible to the game
developer, handles the ownership management of objects. As we have seen in
section 3.4.3, this is not very complex and in our implementation it boils down
to a few lines of code. This layer will hardly have any noticeable impact on
performance.
The second layer below handles the pub/sub message dissemination and in-
volves sending data over the network. In order to minimize messaging overhead,
a custom implementation for the target architecture should be chosen in favor
of a generic pub/sub system. Generic systems may provide a great variety of
functionality which isn’t always necessary or even useful in a gaming context.
Naturally, these systems cause a far greater overhead compared to a custom
implementation. Our implementation of the three network modes currently
supported does not cause additional messaging overhead in comparison to tra-
ditional systems. And in any case the maximum network delay is the roundtrip
time between the node sending a request and the node that answers with an up-
date. In the case where the owner manipulates an object directly, only the delay
for sending the update is incurred. What is left is the overhead to determine
the nodes to which requests and updates have to be sent. By using a naming
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scheme that allows mapping of owner names to nodes, only a single operation
on a lookup table has to be performed.
3.8.2 Cheating
No multiplayer online game today can come along without some protection
against cheating, since the possibility to cheat poses a major threat to the
fairness of the game.[31, 58, 86] Fairness is a critical factor for enjoying a game
and consequently cheating may drive away paying customers. While the Anti
Cheating mode is discussed in detail in the following section, we want to touch
on this topic in the context of the other two network modes. In the CCS mode,
all trust is imposed on the server and our framework doesn’t change this. A
P2P node within the Replicated Simulation is responsible for the object it owns.
However, all peers receive updates about changes of that object and they may
check themselves if those changes conform to the rules of the game. Otherwise
they may reject an update.
The only thing the framework has to guarantee is that no one is able to
forge messages. E.g., if a node receives an update, it must be sure that the
sender is really the owner of that object. Nodes may simply be identified by
IP addresses or, if a higher level of security is necessary or object ownership
must outlast network sessions, cryptographic signatures may be used. For this
purpose a public key infrastructure is necessary which can be run by the game
publisher.
Chapter 4
Resilience against Cheating
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will evolve a cheat-resistant Peer-to-Peer game system design.
First, we give a characterization of our system and an introduction to the topic
of cheating. Next, we start the discussion of our approach on a rather abstract
level to point out the main concepts. Later on we will discuss its implications
in more detail and give a in-depth description of the actual system and how it
handles different cheating scenarios. Finally, we discuss scalability issues and
the general applicability of our approach.
4.1.1 System Classification
Before we can classify our system, we give a very brief overview of its structure.
The objective of our system is to shift the computational load and network
bandwidth consumption from the server to the players’ computers. The basic
idea is that a player’s node may act at the same time as a client and a server
for different parts of the game world (which are referred to as a regions in the
following). As will be described later, a region is replicated among multiple
nodes in order to prevent cheating. Players whose avatars are located in a
certain region connect as clients to the player nodes that act as a server for
a replica of that region. This way, the game publisher is relieved from the
resource-intensive task of providing servers for the game world.
According to the definitions given in [93], our system classifies as a Peer-to-
Peer system for the following reasons:
• Resources like bandwidth, storage and processing power are located on
the peer nodes. Each peer utilizes resources provided by other peers.
• In order to utilize these resources, peers directly interact with each other
over a network.
• Each peer can act both as a client and a sever for a game region. All peers
are equal partners with symmetric functionality.
To be more specific, our system falls into the category of an unstructured
centralized P2P system. The system is unstructured in the sense that the content
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(i.e. a game region replica) stored on a certain peer and the peer’s IP address
are unrelated. Assignment of region replicas are to peers is described in section
4.3.3. Our system is centralized since it needs a central server that acts as an
entry point to the network and manages the assignment of regions to peers.
However, the central server is only needed when nodes join or leave the system.
In contrast to centralized P2P systems like Napster [77], where the server has to
be contacted for every query operation and thus poses a potential bottleneck,
the resource demand on the server side is minimized.
4.1.2 Definition and Taxonomy of Cheating
Though cheating is rampant in todays online games, there is often no clear
understanding of this topic and a lack of terms and definitions. Yan and Randell
[110] were the first to give a rather comprehensive overview of cheating in online
games and to define a cheating taxonomy. They define cheating as
...any behavior that a player uses to gain an advantage over his peer
players or achieve a target in an online game [...] if, according to
the game rules [...], the advantage or the target is one that he is not
supposed to have achieved.
Their cheating taxonomy consists of three dimensions:
By vulnerability. A cheat can be performed either by exploiting a flaw in the
game system or vulnerabilities of the people involved in the game. The
former includes implementation errors and game design flaws, the latter
social engineering attacks and abuse by insiders (e.g. game operators).
By consequence. Players can try to violate the integrity of the game, e.g.
making their avatars more powerful by raising their strength or their hit-
point values. They can also achieve unfair advantages by gaining access
to confidential information, e.g. finding out about the position of hidden
enemy players. Another possibility to put other players at a disadvantage
is the denial of services they want to use. The whole purpose of cheating
is the violation of fairness. The paper lists this a separate consequence.
However, we believe that fairness violation is rather a subsumption of the
consequences mentioned before.
By cheating principal. Cheats can be performed by players, game operators
or a cooperating group that may include both.
Yan and Randell do not mention a different kind of cheaters, the so-called
“griefers” [56]. As the name implies, the sole intention of these people is to
hurt other players’ game experience. While griefing may actually be performed
without breaking any game rules (e.g. insulting other players through the player
chat), griefers may also exploit possible cheats to hurt other players, e.g. killing
their avatars or stealing their items. The difference between cheaters and griefers
is that griefers do not expect any game-related benefit from their actions. From
a technical point of view, the possible attacks for griefers are the same as for
regular cheaters. However, one should keep in mind that griefers may tend to
use those attacks that are not particularly attractive to others.
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4.1.3 Cheating Attacks Specific to P2P Online Games
Many of the cheating attacks mentioned by Yan and Randell also apply to
traditional Client/Server architectures and countermeasures have already been
developed in this context. In this work we do not address attacks like exploiting
game design bugs and implementation errors, hacking into servers or compro-
mising passwords through social engineering. Instead, we will focus on those
attacks that we identified to be inherent (but not necessarily exclusive) to a
Peer-to-Peer online gaming system. These are
Exploiting Misplaced Trust In a Peer-to-Peer online gaming system, the
software as well as game state data may be stored locally on players’
machines (which we assume to be untrusted, we will come back to this issue
later). This makes them susceptible to any kind of malicious manipulation.
Exploiting Lack of Secrecy As stated above, all game state is stored on
untrusted nodes. Without further protection a node is not only able to
access all data that is stored locally but it may also disclose it to other
nodes.
Collusion Any untrusted nodes within the system may collude in performing
cheats.
It is unclear why the paper lists Collusion as a separate cheating attack and at
the same time mentions cooperating attackers in the cheating principal dimen-
sion. We consider Collusion as being orthogonal to the other two attacks since
both, Exploiting Misplaced Trust and Exploiting Lack of Secrecy, can be per-
formed either by a single player or by multiple colluding players. Consequently
we will discuss both in the context of a single attacker and multiple colluding
attackers.
Within the first dimension of the cheating taxonomy, the vulnerability, both
attacks above fall into the category of a game design flaw and thus have to
addressed by the design of the system. This is discussed in section 4.2. Within
the second dimension, the cheating consequence, they either violate integrity
or disclose confidential information. How these attacks affect gameplay will
be discussed in the following section. Within the last dimension, the cheating
principal, the attacks can either be performed by a single player or by multiple
cooperating players. The differences that arise from this are discussed in the
respective sections on the cheating attack scenarios.
4.1.4 Impact of Successful Attacks
We consider Exploiting Misplaced Trust by manipulating game logic to be the
most dangerous of all possible attacks, since it is relevant to any kind of game
and can have an arbitrarily high impact. In games, where the player directly
controls a virtual character, a cheater may make himself invincible by altering
his avatar’s attributes. In a racing game he can raise the speed of his vehicle,
while in a strategy game he can provide himself with unlimited resources or
money. As soon as a cheater has the possibility to modify the game state or
logic, his options are virtually unlimited. The system we propose focuses on
this kind of attack and thus provides appropriate countermeasures.
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In contrast to that, the relevance of Exploiting Lack of Secrecy is heavily
dependent on the kind of game. In a strategy game, for example, knowing
the position of enemy troops can give a crucial advantage over other players
and eventually decide over winning or losing. But in games where reflexes and
other skills are more essential than strategy, information about other players’
avatars are much less relevant. Often these game do provide this information
anyway, e.g. players can directly see the health status of others within the game.
Note that this kind of attack can only partially be addressed, since one cannot
prevent a player that has legal access to a certain piece of information from
disclosing it to other players. For example, for team-mates in online games it is
quite common to use an external voice channel. Nobody can prevent them from
exchanging information through the channel that cannot be exchanged directly
within the game. Our system tries to hide data from prying eyes as much as
possible.
4.2 Main Concepts
Before we can start a detailed description of our system, it is necessary to
introduce the basic principles by which the attacks identified above can be
counteracted.
4.2.1 Addressing Misplaced Trust
In traditional Client/Server online games, misplaced trust is not a major issue.
Assuming that the system is properly designed, all data is stored and processed
out of the reach of a client on a trusted server. Clients usually act as a graphical
terminal which takes input from the player, sends it as a request to the server
and receives an update of the game state which it displays on the screen. A
client may cache data and perform its own calculations on it but only for local
purposes. Only the data stored on the server is authoritative and clients never
exchange any data directly.
A regular node in a Peer-to-Peer system is usually not trusted because the
player has unrestricted access to the software and the data that is stored on his
computer. There exists an attempt to improve the trustworthiness of computers
that are not under direct control of a trusted authority. However, this approach
(called Trusted Computing) has certain shortcomings which are discussed in
section 2.3. For our system, we assume that a client is inherently not trustworthy
and thus any data that it stores and any result that it computes may be falsified.
On the one hand, we want to utilize the computing capacity of the players’
machines. On the other, we cannot trust the data that the node stores and
computes. Obviously, we need a way to check the validity of the information
from the node. Having a trusted server running in parallel to reproduce and
check the results of the nodes would be pointless. If it has to perform all the
calculations again, we have won nothing but incur an additional message passing
overhead. Having a trusted server performing only random samples occasionally
does not work, too. In order to reproduce a node’s calculation the server would
need to know the exact state of the game before and after the calculation. But
since the server does not keep track of the whole game state, it would need again
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to trust the node to send the correct states. The only option that is left is to
let other peers in the system check the results that a node produces.
Since there is no way of directly judging the trustworthiness of a node, we
cannot rely on a single one to perform this checking. However, it is safe to
assume that most of the players are honest and would report a malicious node
if they notice one, since it is disrupting their game experience. If a significant
part of the players were trying to cheat, playing a game wouldn’t be a lot of fun
even if measures are taken to prevent cheating. If we replicate the processing
of game state data on randomly chosen nodes, the majority of them will very
likely agree on the correct state.
The Byzantine Generals Problem
The agreement problem that arises here reminds us of one well-known to com-
puter science: the Byzantine Generals Problem [65]. In order to illustrate the
problem, Lamport et al. describe a scenario where a group of generals of the
Byzantine army are camped with their troops around an enemy city. A com-
manding general issues an order to the camped lieutenant generals (e.g. whether
to attack the city or not). All generals may communicate only via messenger
and one or more of them (including the commanding general) may be traitors
which try to confuse the others. The generals need an algorithm to guarantee
that
a) all loyal lieutenant generals follow the same order.
b) if the commanding general is loyal, every loyal lieutenant general follows his
order.
The paper shows that, assuming signed messages are used, an agreement (called
Byzantine Agreement) can be achieved if there are at least two loyal generals.
Signed messages mean
a) a loyal general’s signature cannot be forged and any alteration of his message
can be detected.
b) anyone can verify the authenticity of a general’s signature.
An important contribution of Lamport et al. was the introduction of the Byzan-
tine error model. This model assumes that nodes may not only crash and simply
stop functioning, but they may also malfunction without stopping. A malicious
node can be seen as a node that fails in a Byzantine manner, since, from a
technical point of view, it makes no difference whether a node exhibits a wrong
behavior intentionally or not.
Now, how is the Byzantine Generals Problem similar to our situation? The
commanding general can be seen as a player that sends a request to change the
state of the game. If the request is legal with regard to the game rules (i.e.
the commander is loyal), all loyal peers will fulfill the request. If not, all loyal
peers will drop the request and agree not to make a change to the game state.
Cheating nodes could perform illegal changes to the game state that benefit
them and try to make the other nodes to agree on this change.
Unfortunately, the original Byzantine Agreement solution is very expensive
in both the amount of time and the number of messages required. In case there
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are m malicious nodes, the algorithm requires message paths of length up to
m+1. This would cause a messages latency that is intolerable for todays online
games. Moreover, the additional traffic generated by the amount of necessary
messages would slow the system down even more (please refer to the paper for
a calculation of the message overhead). However, we can avoid this overhead
by relaxing our requirements.
We need the loyal nodes to agree on a certain state change in the presence
of Byzantine nodes. However, it is not necessary that the loyal nodes know that
they agree. Above we made the assumption that most of the nodes belong to
honest players. If they receive the same legal request, they perform the correct
change without the need to communicate with each other. Afterwards they send
an update that reflects the change to the interested nodes. Since the majority
of updates that any receiver gets are equal, the receiver knows which update to
accept.
Naturally, our simplified approach has some drawbacks. While the Byzantine
agreement (using signed messages) can tolerate that m out of m + 2 nodes
are malicious, we can tolerate only m malicious nodes out of 2m + 1 nodes.
This meets the assumption we have made above. A special case we have not
mentioned yet is when a node sends different legal requests to the other nodes.
In this case each node will perform a different but legal change and send an
appropriate update. The nodes receiving the different updates cannot determine
the correct one anymore. As we will see later, our system can only detect those
attacks (by using signed messages), but cannot prevent them in the first place.
4.2.2 Addressing Lack of Secrecy
If we look at the traditional Client/Server scenario, protecting confidential in-
formation is straightforward. All data is stored on a trusted server and each
client receives only the information that it is allowed to have. For example, the
position information of enemy troops which are outside the vision range of a
certain player is not send to that player’s node. Restricting the flow of infor-
mation to a client is usually referred to as Interest Management [50]. Interest
management is not only used for keeping information confidential; an important
application is to save bandwidth consumption by avoiding to send unnecessary
information.
As mentioned above, once a player has gained access to a certain piece of
information he is free to forward it to any other player. It is common practice
today that players of online games communicate through voice channels in order
to coordinate their actions. Nobody can prevent a player who has seen an
enemy hiding behind a corner from informing another player who approaches
the hiding spot unsuspectingly. Most of the online games actually benefit from
such information exchange as it adds an additional strategic component to the
game. However, there are games which become pointless if such an exchange is
performed. Think of a digital version of a card game like Bridge [108], where two
players form a partnership but they do not know each other’s cards. Disclosing
information about the cards on your hand to your partner would destroy the
whole appeal of the game. Since there is no way for a game provider to prevent
this, certain games are not suitable for playing online if the players don’t trust
each other.
Keeping data confidential in a Peer-to-Peer system can be done in two ways.
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First, a piece of data is only stored on nodes that are allowed to access it. Second,
if confidential data must be stored on a node that is not allowed to access it
(e.g. for caching or relaying purposes), it must be encrypted. Obviously, the
same problem as in a Client/Server system arises. A node that may legally
access a piece of data may disclose it to other nodes through channels external
to the game. The system we propose distributes game state data in a way that
minimizes the chance that one of two colluding nodes has access to confidential
data that may be of interest for the other.
4.2.3 Preventing vs. Detecting Cheating
In some cases it is not possible to prevent cheating in the first place. Above
we mentioned the case that a malicious player sends different but legal action
requests to different game state replicas. If the replicas do not communicate with
each other, none of them can detect this situation and will process these request,
resulting in different states at the replicas. Eventually, if enough replicas arrived
at a different state, it becomes impossible that any update achieves a majority.
No later than this the attack will be detected and the question arises who is
to be blamed. If we require every request to be signed, it is easy to detect the
origin of the attack. Every replica can prove that it received a request that
differs from the others since it was signed by the sender.
Detecting attacks only after they have been successfully performed may
sound unattractive at first. However, remember that all players are paying
subscribers of the online game service. If their cheating attempt is detected,
they will most likely be banned from the game service. They loose all their
achievements in the game and at least the money they have paid for their cur-
rent subscription period. Additionally, the terms of conditions could require a
subscriber to pay a fine for disrupting the service or the game publisher could
even take legal actions. Since a cheater can be clearly identified by his signature,
it is very unlikely that a player will take this risk.
4.3 Region Replication
We have discussed so far that the game state and logic is replicated on peer
nodes. Whenever a player’s node requests a change of the game world, it will
send a corresponding message to the replicas. The replicas perform the change
and send updates to all nodes that have to be informed about the change.
Finally, the receiving nodes compare the updates and accept the one that holds
the majority. This explanation is rather abstract, so in the following we will go
into more detail.
4.3.1 Partitioning of the Game World
Depending on the game, the size of its state and the computational resources to
manage it varies heavily. Session-based games with few players usually have a
very small state and low resource consumption so that in a Client/Server system
the server may host multiple sessions at once. On the contrary, the state of a
single Massively Multiplayer Online Game world sometimes is huge so that it
has to be distributed over multiple servers. Though players usually own rather
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powerful computers, their computing power cannot be compared to that of a
dedicated server. While smaller session-based games can easily be managed by
a player machine, it is obvious that it cannot handle the complete state of large
online games.
Since splitting large game worlds into parts that can be handled by single
servers is a common approach, we will adopt it for the players’ computers as
well. Game worlds usually represent two- or three-dimensional space, so a seg-
mentation into spatial regions is the most natural one. Managing game world
regions on different nodes is straightforward, as long as there is no interaction
between them that would require a synchronization of shared objects. Every
node that hosts a region manages only the game objects contained in it and
performs all the logic necessary, i.e. it receiving change requests, performing
the changes and sending updates to interested players. Of course regions may
not be completely separated from each other. In order to form a contiguous
world, players must at least be able to travel between regions. Speaking techni-
cally, moving from one region to each other means a transfer of a player object
between the nodes that manage the regions. Since the object simply disappears
from one region and reappears in another this still doesn’t introduce any shared
state and thus there is no need for synchronization between regions.
Having separated regions which only allow players to move from one region
to another but not any further inter-region interactions is still prevalent in
todays online games. Instead of aiming at seamless game worlds that hide
region borders from players with complex synchronization techniques, modern
game providers go in the opposite direction. Nearly every successful MMOG
today makes use of so-called instances. An instance is a separate region of the
game world that is only shared by a small group of players (usually between
five and forty). Different groups of players can occupy the same region, but
each group gets their own copy of the region from scratch. The benefit for the
player group is that they can explore the region, kill monsters there and loot
the treasures without being disturbed by other players. The most successful
MMOG today, World of Warcraft [14], uses instances for special parts of the
world, mostly dungeons. Another very successful online game, Guild Wars [2],
uses instances for nearly all areas. Only gathering places like cities that serve
as connection points between instance regions are managed in the usual way.
For the game provider, the most important advantage of instances is that they
avoid costly synchronization between regions that would eventually limit the
scalability of the game in terms of the number of simultaneous players. Having
small and separate regions allows the provider to create as many of them as
necessary with negligible overhead. Moreover, instances can be spawned on
any server that is currently not working at its full capacity. The small size of
instances makes their resource consumption highly predictable, thus allowing
for an optimal utilization of resources. The huge success of the instance concept
shows that partitioning game worlds into rather small regions is not a serious
limitation for the game experience as long as it is properly integrated.
Note that when we talk about inter-region interactions, this does not include
communication systems which allow sending text or voice messages to other
players. These systems can be seen as external services that have no direct
effect on the game state and do not require any synchronization of in-game
objects.
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4.3.2 Distribution of Game State and Logic
We have discussed how to split the game state into smaller chunks that are
small enough to be handled by players’ computers. Next, we show how these
chunks are distributed among the peer nodes. For every region of the game
world we need a set of nodes that manage the state of that region. For the rest
of this work we refer to these nodes as Region Controllers (RCs). Every Region
Controller manages the complete state of its corresponding region, i.e. the state
of a region is replicated on all its RCs. The counterpart of a Region Controller
is the Game Client which represents a player in the game. Every Game Client
sends requests according to the player’s desired actions to the RCs that manage
the region in which the player is located. The Region Controllers process the
request and send updates to all Game Clients of the region that need to be
informed about the change. Finally, the Game Clients display the changes onto
the players’ screens. Note that ”Region Controller“ and ”Game Client“ are just
roles played by a node in the system. Every node can play both roles, even at
the same time. The interaction between the two roles is nearly identical to that
between a client and a server in a traditional Client/Server online game.
Now how do nodes become Region Controllers or Game Clients? The as-
signment of roles to nodes is handled by a Management Service that is offered
by the game provider and serves as the central entry point to the system. This
service may also take care of subscription management, accounting and billing.
E.g. it would reject a player that hasn’t paid his subscription fees or was banned
from the game.
In the bootstrapping phase of the game, where no or only a few nodes are
online, the service offers some initial Region Controller instances. Because of
the low number of players at that time this not a very resource-intensive task.
Note that because these initial RCs are run by the game provider, they are
trustworthy and thus a single one is enough to manage a region (there is no
mutual checking of RCs required). As more nodes join the system, the initial
Region Controllers can be replaced with Region Controller groups that consist
of regular peer nodes. As soon as there are enough nodes in the system, the
initial Region Controllers are not needed anymore.
Whenever a player wants to enter the game his node contacts the Manage-
ment Service. Depending on the region in which the player starts (e.g. the same
region as he was in when he left), the player’s node receives the list of Region
Controllers that are currently responsible for that region. The RCs are informed
about the new Game Client and from now on both sides can start communicat-
ing with each other. His node is also added to the Region Controller pool. This
means that whenever a new RC is needed (e.g. to replace one that left or has
failed), it can be taken from the pool. Usually we need significantly less Region
Controllers than there are nodes in the system (an issue that will be discussed
later). For this reason, there is no danger of running out of pooled RCs. Only
if the total number of nodes is very low, some initial Region Controllers have to
be provided.
We assume that players only join the system when they actually want to
play, i.e. their node always becomes a Game Client. However, it is thinkable
that players offer to act as an Region Controller even if they do not play them-
selves currently. They simply grant their unused resources to the system. The
Management Service could account for the time that a node spends as an RC.
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As a reward, players could get discounts on their subscriptions or — even more
tempting for hardcore players and free of cost for the game publisher — exclu-
sive items and abilities for their avatar. This way a game publisher can easily
make the donation of computing power to the system very attractive.
4.3.3 Replica Selection
Whenever a node that acts as a Region Controller leaves the system, it needs
to be replaced to maintain the desired number of replicas per region. For this
purpose, the Management Service keeps a pool of available nodes that may be-
come a Region Controller. Choosing nodes from this pool could simply be done
in a random fashion, but there exist more sophisticated selection methods. In
the literature, this problem is often referred to as the Referee Selection Problem
[106, 105], where referee is a synonym for Region Controller.
There are several criteria which may be considered when selecting a Region
Controller:
Security. First, we want to avoid that a node is a Game Client and a Region
Controller for the same region at the same time. This way we can pre-
vent a cheater from directly accessing data of the region where his avatar
currently resides. Furthermore, we want to keep the probability that col-
luding cheaters become Region Controllers for the same region as low as
possible.
Responsiveness. The network delay between a Game Client and any of its
Region Controllers should be as low as possible.
Fairness. There should be no large variation of the delay between different
Game Clients and the Region Controller.
Note that fairness and responsiveness are conflicting goals. If one of the Game
Clients has a connection with a high delay, fairness would mean to artificially
delay updates to the other Game Clients and thus lowering the overall respon-
siveness. Webb et al. [107] have proposed two algorithms for selecting Region
Controllers out of pool of available nodes, namely SRS-1 and SRS-2. The first
aims for responsiveness while the second aims for fairness. Depending on the
requirements of the game, a game developer has to choose between the two
algorithms.
Both algorithms determine a set of nodes with the chance that a majority of
them is corrupt being very low. For this purpose, they use a selection protocol
proposed by Corman et al. that allows to minimize this probability to less than
10−5 [29]. This protocols ensures that our basic assumption, that the majority of
Region Controllers for a region is honest, holds true. SRS-1 tries to find Region
Controllers that have a low average delay to their clients, accepting that the
delay variation may be high at the cost of fairness. In contrast, SRS-2 tries to
minimize the delay variation at the cost of a higher average delay, thus reducing
responsiveness. Both algorithms offer to artificially inflate the delays between
nodes for a fine-tuning of the trade-off between fairness and responsiveness.
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4.3.4 Consistency
In section 4.2 we described that the correct game state is determined by the
Game Clients through a voting mechanism. All Region Controllers of a region
send their updates to each Game Client and the one that holds the majority
is taken as the correct one. Yet the question remains, how do the Region
Controllers arrive at the same state? A consistency model defines what a node
in a distributed system gets when it performs a read operation on its local
replica of the global state.
Many different consistency models have been presented in the literature,
[92] contains a rather comprehensive overview. Ideally, one would expect that
any change that is made to the global state is reflected immediately on all
replicas. However, because of the latency incurred by the underlying network,
remote operations are always performed with a certain delay. This wouldn’t
be a problem by itself, since most applications could accept this small delay.
However, whenever two nodes perform a remote write operation on the same
data item nearly at the same time, the order of execution could depend on how
long the appropriate message takes to arrive at the receiver. If write messages
arrive in different orders at different nodes, a subsequent read operation on that
data could return a different value on each node. Therefore, a consistency model
has to determine the order of execution of read and write operations.
The most intuitive model, Strict Consistency, requires that any read opera-
tion on a data item returns the value of the most recent write operation. Put in
other words, all operations are executed exactly in the order they were issued.
This requires that every operation can be assigned an unambiguous timestamp
according to some global clock. Unfortunately, the clocks of network nodes can-
not be perfectly synchronized to a global reference time. This is the reason why
achieving strict consistency is not feasible in a distributed system [96]. For this
reason, weaker consistency models have been proposed. Weaker refers to the
more relaxed assumption that there has to be some global order of execution
which is not necessarily the same order as it would be seen by a global clock.
Lamport proposed the Sequential Consistency Model [64] which can be de-
scribed by two requirements. First, all operations issued by a certain node have
to be executed in the order they were issued. Second, operations issued by
different nodes must be executed in some global order. Together, both require-
ments guarantee that there is a total ordering of all operations in the system.
Thus, all nodes will perceive the same global state.
Linearizability [49] (also known as Atomic Consistency) is similar to se-
quential consistency. As stated above, it is not possible to synchronize clocks of
different nodes exactly. Because of this, linearizability only requires that every
operation is assigned a time interval instead of an exact point in time. The
size of the time interval can be chosen depending on the accuracy of the clock
synchronization that is in use. To ensure linearizability, sequential consistency
must be ensured and the resulting sequential total order must correspond to an
order that can be achieved by placing each operation at a single point in time
within its time interval. Essentially, if two operations’ time spans do not overlap
they must be executed in the correct timely order. Linearizability is a slightly
stronger model than Sequential Consistency but also more expensive in terms
of worst-case response time [5].
There exist even weaker consistency models that only guarantee a partial
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global ordering of operations. For example, the Causal Consistency Model [1]
only guarantees that causally related operations are executed in the same order
on each replica. Writes that are not causally related (so called concurrent writes)
may be executed in different orders. Only if a program meets certain conditions
(please consult the paper for details) the causal consistency model produces
histories that are also sequentially consistent.
Our voting mechanism requires that Region Controllers arrive at the same
state. A consistency model that does not enforce a total global ordering of
operations is not sufficient. Thus, our system must maintain the replicas at least
sequentially consistent. As described above, sequential consistency requires that
all requests sent by a single node are processed in the order they were issued by
that node and that there is some global sequence of all requests. To achieve this,
we can exploit the fact that all games break down time into discrete slices, called
frames. Sometimes games use frames of variable length but in our system the
length of each frame is equal. Every client may issue a single request per frame
and transmits the frame number within each request. Since the frame number is
simply incremented for each frame, the sequence of requests sent by a single node
can easily be maintained. To achieve a total global ordering of requests sent by
all nodes we only need to find a global order for each frame. Within a frame
they can be processed according to a fixed and unique client id that is assigned
by the Management Service. Of course this does not retain the original order
the requests were made by the clients. But this would mean striving for strict
consistency which is not feasible in a distributed system anyway as explained
above. Since frame sizes are usually very small — much less than a second —
reordering requests within a frame will not be noticeable to players. The order
of request processing can be changed every frame (e.g. rotating the order).
Otherwise the player with the lowest id is always the first to act, which would
probably affect fairness.
Now that we know how Region Controllers can determine a fixed order for
incoming requests, we still need to describe how all nodes of a region can keep
their frame advancement synchronized. At the beginning of a frame, the Game
Clients send their requests. After processing these requests, the Region Con-
trollers finish the frame by sending their updates. Of course we cannot wait
until all Game Clients have made their requests or all Region Controllers have
answered with an update. Otherwise we would enable a single malicious node
to slow down the game arbitrarily. That is why we chose frames with a fixed
length. After the time of a frame has elapsed, each nodes starts with the next
frame. To keep the frame advancement synchronized, the clock deviation of
the nodes may not exceed a certain limit. For this reason we make use of the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [72]. In section 5 we evaluate the effects of clock
skew on our system and show that the deviation error introduced by using NTP
is acceptable for our system.
Until now we have only talked about consistency among replicas. Since the
client software running on the player’s node only visualizes the update sent by
the majority of replicas it is always consistent with them. The only thing we
have to care about on the client-side is the delay caused by the request/reply
round-trip. Since the quality of the players’ game experience is affected by this
delay [83], it can be hidden from the player using techniques like Dead Reckoning
[82] or Pre-Reckoning [34].
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4.3.5 Update Propagation
The approaches to update propagation can be differentiated into Active Repli-
cation and the Primary-Backup Approach [17]. Active replication means that
requests made by clients are sent directly to all replicas. Following the primary-
backup approach, requests are sent to a single replica, called primary replica
(PR), which processes the request. The remaining secondary replicas (SRs) re-
ceive a state update message from the PR after the request has been processed.
The primary-backup approach bears the danger that a malicious primary
replica could send falsified updates. Although this could be detected later, we
want to prevent this right from the start. We could allow the PR to relay only
client requests instead of sending complete updates to the secondary replicas.
Since requests sent by clients are signed they cannot be modified by the PR. The
only option left for a malicious PR is to drop client requests instead of relaying
them to the SRs. If primary-backup update propagation is applied, sequential
consistency can be achieved easily, since all updates are applied directly to the
primary replica. The SRs will perform updates with a delay but this does not
affect gameplay as long as the PR is working correctly. If the PR fails, one of
the SRs has to take over. Any updates that have not already been applied to the
SRs have to be resent by the clients which could delay gameplay significantly.
Probably the biggest problem is that an SR with a corrupt game state (because
of cheating or other faults) may become the PR in case of a failure. It is not yet
clear how a new PR can be elected without opening new loopholes for cheaters.
Our system proposed in this paper uses the active replication since there are
no solutions yet for the problems related to the primary-backup approach. But
future research will probably yield solutions for these problems, providing an
alternative system model that can be evaluated and compared to the current
system.
4.4 Normal Operation
Up to now, we have described the individual parts and concepts our system
is composed of. In this section we describe how the parts of the system work
together under the assumption that no malicious nodes are present.
4.4.1 Bootstrapping
The starting point of our system is the central Management Service that is
provided by the game publisher. It has a public Internet address that is known
to all nodes in the system. Whenever a node wants to join, it starts by contacting
the Management Service.
Initially, the game world is empty, i.e. it is not populated by any players.
When the first player joins the game, he will start in one of the game world’s
regions. Since there are no Region Controllers available yet and a node may
not become RC and Game Client of the same region at the same time, the
Management Service will provide an initial RC instance for his starting region.
Remember that a single initial Region Controller is sufficient, since it is run
by the game publisher and thus trustworthy. As more players join the game,
other regions of the game will be populated in the same manner. However,
more players mean more nodes that can act as Region Controllers and serve
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the regions of the initial RCs. At a certain point in time, there will be enough
Region Controllers provided by player nodes so that an initial RC can withdraw
from its region. Usually the number of RCs per region will be lower than ten,
while the number of players may reach several dozens or even several hundreds.
This ensures that the number of nodes in the system far outnumbers the number
of required Region Controllers and the system will not run short of available
RCs. Only if the number of nodes drops to a very low level, RCs provided by
the game publisher have to take over some regions again.
4.4.2 Game Client Login
The process of a Game Client logging into the system is shown in figure 4.1 as
an UML sequence diagram. Note that this and the following sequence diagrams
show only two exemplary Region Controllers and Game Clients respectively.
1. Since all players are subscribers of the game service, they are registered
at the Management Service. Whenever a player starts his Game Client, it
contacts this service.
2. The client receives all the necessary information, e.g. a unique player id,
a pair of cryptographic keys to sign its messages, the public keys of its
responsible Region Controllers and any other necessary information.
3. The Management Service informs every RC of the region in which the
player starts about the new player. This includes at least the Internet
address of the new node, its public key and any initial state of the player
(if he doesn’t start from scratch).
4. After the Region Controllers have learned about the new player, each of
them sends the state of the player’s immediate surroundings to his node.
5. The Game Client of the player waits until it has received the same initial
game state from a majority of Region Controllers.
6. Now it can start the request-update cycle that is repeated until the player
leaves the game again. The Game Client receives the commands from the
player and send an appropriate request to all RCs. Each of the Region
Controllers process the request and generates an update. This update is
sent back to all interested Game Clients, which compare all of them and
choose the one that holds the majority.
4.4.3 Game Client Logout
Figure 4.2 shows the process of a Game Client logging out of the system.
1. When the player wants to exit the game, the Game Client sends a log-out
message to the Management Service.
2. The service informs all responsible Region Controller about the leaving of
the player and they stop sending updates to his node.
3. If any state of the player needs to be saved, the RCs may send it to the
Management Service. As soon as the service received the majority of
player state messages it adopts the contained changes.
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Figure 4.1: Game Client login procedure
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Figure 4.2: Game Client logout procedure
4.4.4 Region Controller Login
Figure 4.3 shows the process of a Region Controller logging into the system.
1. At the same time when the player’s Game Client logs into the system, the
node registers itself as an available Region Controller. The Management
Service adds the node to the list of pooled RCs.
2. Whenever a new Region Controller is needed, e.g. if currently active Re-
gion Controller leaves the system or an initial RC needs to be replaced, an
RC from the pool is activated. The Management Service sends a message
to the new RC containing a list of Game Clients that it needs to serve.
3. In case that the new Region Controller replaces another, the Management
Service informs the other RCs that still manage the region. They start to
send the current state of the region to the new RC.
4. The Management Service informs all Game Clients of the region about
their new Region Controller. The GCs start sending requests to the new
RC. At this point, the Game Clients do not expect to receive updates from
the new RC yet.
5. After some time, the new Region Controller has received the state of
the region from the majority of the other RCs. This data is already
outdated, because it reflects the state of the game at the time the RC was
activated. However, since the new RC received all the client requests since
its activation, it can apply them to the outdated state and bring itself up
to date.
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6. Now the Region Controller can start to serve the Game Clients of the
region through the normal request-update cycle as it is described in step
6 in section 4.4.2.
4.4.5 Region Controller Logout
Figure 4.4 shows the process of a Region Controller logging out of the system.
1. Whenever a player leaves the game, it unregisters the Region Controller
running on its node.
2. The Management Service sends a message to each Game Client that is
served by this Region Controller. They stop sending requests to this RC.
3. If the RC has just been a pooled RC, it is simply removed from the pool.
If it has been an active RC, the activation of a new RC is triggered (see
step 2 in section 4.4.4).
4.4.6 Player Changing Regions
Figure 4.5 shows process of a player changing from one region to another.
1. Leaving a region, as any other action, starts with a request of the player’s
Game Client to all Region Controllers. Depending on the actual game,
it can mean that the player’s avatar enters a portal or crosses a certain
border that represents the connection point between two regions.
2. All Region Controllers transmit the current state of the player to the
Management Service. As usual, the correct player state is determined by
a voting process.
3. The player state that has been elected is now transmitted to all Region
Controllers of the region the player wants to enter.
4. All new Region Controllers transmit the current state of the region to the
Game Client.
5. As soon as the majority of RCs sent the correct state, the Game Client
can start the usual request-update cycle.
4.5 Cheating Attack Scenarios
In this section we discuss the various attacks that may be performed by Game
Clients, Region Controllers or a combination of both. We show that attacks
which procure a direct benefit for the performing malicious node can be pre-
vented in the first place. Attacks which do not benefit the attacker but just
negatively affect the experience of other players (e.g. interrupting the game)
can at least be detected.
It is very important that the game publisher can trace malicious nodes in or-
der to penalize them. For this purpose, we require that all messages exchanged
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Figure 4.3: Region Controller login procedure
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Figure 4.4: Region Controller logout procedure
within the system are signed by the sender. Messages which are not properly
signed won’t be accepted by the receiver. The signature enables honest partic-
ipants of the system to prove the origin of illegal requests or falsified updates.
The fact that a cheater will eventually be identified makes such attempts very
risky. Penalties for performing cheats usually include that the fraudulent play-
ers will be banned from the system, losing all their achievements and the fees
they have already paid.
4.5.1 Attacks performed by Game Clients
The possibilities for a Game Client to cheat are rather limited.A manipulation
of a client’s local game state would be futile because it never transmits its state
to anyone else. The only option left is to manipulate the requests it sends. A
request may contain raw player input (e.g. mouse clicks, button presses) or
more abstract commands (e.g. ”move to (x,y)”, ”attack object z”). In any case
the Region Controllers will perform a sanity check on the request: the state
transition caused by the request must be legal according to the rules of the
game. If a request would cause an illegal state transition it is simply dropped
by all honest RCs.
In the following examples, nodes are shown as boxes that contain their name
(e.g. GC1 for a Game Client) and below their current state as a string. The
state string consists of the initial state (e.g. S) and all requests that have been
applied to this initial state (e.g. Sαβ means that the requests α and β have
been applied). Honest nodes are marked green while nodes are marked red. Note
that we only show as many nodes as are necessary to illustrate the example.
Usually, there are many more nodes per region and the number of Game Clients
far outnumbers the number of Region Controllers.
In figure 4.6, we show an example where a malicious Game Client sends
an illegal request to all RCs of its region. GC1 is the malicious node sending
the illegal request α, GC2 is an honest node sending the legal request β. After
reception, all Region Controllers process the requests. Because request α is
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Figure 4.5: Player region change procedure
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Figure 4.6: Game Client sends forged request to all Region Controllers
Figure 4.7: Game Client sends forged request to a minority of Region Controllers
illegal, they simply drop it and only apply update β, arriving at state Sβ. The
updates sent by the Region Controllers thus reflect only request β and the attack
of GC1 has been prevented.
Although a single client cannot enforce a fraudulent game state change, it
may cause other trouble. By sending an illegal action request only to a subset of
Region Controllers, while sending a legal one to the others, a client may cause
two groups of RCs to arrive at different states and thus go out of sync.
In figure 4.7 a Game Client sends the illegal request α to a minority of Re-
gion Controllers, while the majority receives the legal request β. Of course,
request α will be rejected by this minority which only applies the legal request
γ from the honest Game Clients. However, the majority will receive the two
legal requests β and γ and process both of them. The two Region Controller
groups arrive at different states. Since the majority determines which state is
correct, the smaller group will be considered out of sync (the nodes are marked
orange) and the Game Clients will request their replacement at the Management
Service. This way a malicious client can trigger the replacement of arbitrary
Region Controllers even if they work correctly. This does not provide a direct
benefit to the client but may be done as a preparation for later cheating at-
tempts, as a denial-of-service attack or simply as a way for griefers to cause
mischief. However, due to the message’s signature, the source of this attack can
be identified later and appropriate actions be taken.
Figure 4.8 shows a similar scenario. This time, however, a majority of Region
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Figure 4.8: Game Client sends forged request to a majority of Region Controllers
Figure 4.9: Region Controller sends forged update to Game Clients
Controllers receives the illegal request β. As a result, they only process request
γ and thus state Sγ is regarded as the correct one. As before, this attack can
be detected and the attacker identified.
Since Game Clients only request changes for game entities that are under
their control (e.g. their own avatar or units that are part of the player’s troops),
there is no benefit for them in colluding with other Game Clients. Region Con-
trollers determine the correctness of requests only according to the game rules.
Since there is no voting for requests, multiple Game Clients cannot convince a
Region Controller to accept an illegal request.
4.5.2 Attacks performed by Region Controllers
In contrast to Game Clients, Region Controllers can manipulate the game state
directly and try to spread these changes.
In figure 4.9, two honest Game Clients send their requests α and β to the
Region Controllers. The first RC is malicious: instead of processing the requests
correctly and arriving at state Sαβ the RC applies the change γ and thus arrives
at state Sγ. The other Region Controllers process the requests correctly and
thus arrive at state Sαβ. Since the majority of updates that are received by
the Game Clients represent the change αβ, the update γ is dropped and the
attack prevented. The Game Clients can inform the game publisher about the
cheating attempt and prove its origin through the message signature.
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Figure 4.10: Multiple Region Controllers send forged update to Game Clients
The case where multiple malicious Region Controllers collude in performing
an attack is very similar. As long as the group of colluding RCs is outnumbered
by honest ones, it will not be able to win the voting procedure. Remember
that our basic assumption is that the majority of Region Controllers per region
is honest. But even if the malicious colluding RCs are in the majority, the
attack could be detected later. Any honest Game Client could send the received
updates to an auditing service which reconstructs the course of the game. Again,
because all messages are signed, the attackers can be traced. See section 6.1 for
more details about this approach.
Another case is when there are multiple malicious Region Controllers which
do not collude. Figure 4.10 shows this situation. As before, two honest Game
Clients send their requests α and β to the Region Controllers. Some of the RCs
are malicious and apply a falsified change to their local state. The remaining
Region Controllers process the requests correctly and thus arrive at state Sαβ.
Even if a majority of RCs is malicious, the Game Clients can determine the
correct state as long as there are at least two honest RCs. If the malicious ones
do not collude the honest RCs will achieve a majority, although no absolute
one. However, for the reasons stated above, Game Clients should only trust an
absolute majority.
Finally, there can be a group of colluding malicious Region Controllers and
additional independent ones. As long as the honest ones outnumber the collud-
ing group, the majority of updates will be correct. Again, however, to be on
the safe side we should only trust an absolute majority.
Unlike a Game Client, a Region Controller cannot disturb the system by
sending different deviating updates to the Game Clients. Through the voting
procedure every Game Clients sorts out incorrect updates sent by single Region
Controllers, no matter whether the updates other Game Clients received from
this RC were different or not.
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4.5.3 Collusion Attacks
Up to now we have only looked at groups of colluding nodes that only consist
of a single type: either all of them are Game Clients or all of them are Region
Controllers. Next, we will have a look at the possibilities of Game Clients to
colluding with Region Controllers.
One way to collude would be to accept forged messages as if they were legal
ones. If a Game Client accepts a forged update from a Region Controller it will
taint its own game state. However, because it has no way of further spreading
this tainted state, doing so would be pointless. The same is true if a Region
Controller accepts an illegal request from a Game Client. This will also result in
an illegal state transition and consequently the RC will send incorrect updates.
For other Game Clients receiving these updates it is irrelevant whether the RC
manipulated the state itself or not. All that they can perceive is that the Region
Controller issues state updates which deviate from the ones received by other
RCs. Thus, this scenario is equivalent to that where a Region Controller issues
forged updates (see section above).
Since attacks that just rely on accepting forged message from a colluding
node do not work, cheaters must combine different attacks. First, a Game
Client confuses honest Region Controllers by sending legal but different action
requests to each of them. Then a group of malicious RCs that collude with the
Game Client can agree on an illegal state transition and send corresponding
updates. All updates sent by the honest Region Controllers are different so the
one sent by the malicious RCs now holds the majority.
This is illustrated in figure 4.11. A malicious Game Client sends an illegal
request to a group of colluding Region Controllers. To each honest RC, it sends a
different but legal request. The malicious Region Controllers accept and process
the illegal request, arriving at the same falsified state. Because all honest RCs
arrive at a different state, they cannot achieve a majority. Instead, the majority
is achieved by updates of the malicious ones although it is not an absolute
majority. Note that in our example the malicious Region Controllers still accept
and process the legal request sent by the honest Game Client. However, the
group of colluding RCs may agree on any falsified state. This state does not
necessarily have to be caused by an illegal request or include requests from
honest clients.
This example shows clearly why only absolute majorities should be accepted,
even if in some cases (see sections above) a simple majority would be sufficient.
As long as our basic assumption that more than half of the Region Controllers
of a region are honest holds true, the colluding RCs cannot achieve an absolute
majority. The voting procedure will simply fail and the malicious nodes can be
traced by their signatures.
4.5.4 Message Omission
So far we have discussed attacks that are based on sending falsified or aberrant
messages. However, an attacker may also try to disturb the game by omitting
certain messages. Fortunately, by not sending a message, a cheater cannot gain
a direct advantage regarding the gameplay. Thus, the incentive to perform an
attack this way may be rather low but nevertheless we discuss this scenario.
If a Game Client does not send an action request for a certain frame it
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Figure 4.11: Game Client colludes with Region Controllers
means that the player simply does nothing. Depending on the implementation,
we can require a Game Client to send a ”No Operation“ (NOP) request when
the player issues no command. No matter whether a Region Controller receives
a NOP or no request at all, it will perform some default state transition for the
corresponding player entities, e.g. continue with the current action or stop the
current action. Obviously, a cheater cannot gain any benefit from not sending
a request. However, a Game Client may send its request only to a subset of
Region Controllers. This is similar to the attack, where a player sends different
legal requests to the RCs. The group which receives the request will perform
a corresponding state transition, while the rest will perform the default action.
Depending on which group is larger, the majority will vote for an update that
either contains the request or the default action. Hence, a Game Client that
does not send a request to some Region Controllers cannot disrupt the voting
procedure. However, it can cause a minority of Region Controllers to become
out-of-sync, since their state deviates from the majority.
In contrast to a Game Client, a Region Controller cannot cause any trouble
by not sending updates. From a Game Client’s point of view, it does not
matter whether an RC sends an incorrect update or no update at all. Both will
be sorted out during the voting procedure. The only difference is that a Game
Client cannot prove that a Region Controller did not send an update.
Some griefers may find it worthwhile to omit requests in order to cause some
Region Controllers go out-of-sync, even if they cannot cause the voting proce-
dure to fail. Though the Region Controllers cannot prove that a certain Game
Client did not send a request, they should report this to the game publisher any-
way. If a certain number of nodes accuses a Game Client of omitting requests,
the game publisher may trust the accusation and penalize the node. This can
be seen as a very basic form of a reputation system [87]. Another possibility is
to use a multicast routing mechanism that discloses the list of recipients to all
receivers of the message. If some recipients were intentionally omitted, every
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node that receives the message can detect this and report it to the game pub-
lisher. Unfortunately, multicast routing is not commonly supported by todays
Internet routers.
4.5.5 Region Controller Replacement
In the sections above we talk about the replacement of Region Controllers if they
become inconsistent. Replacing RCs is necessary to keep the degree of replica-
tion at the desired level in order to maintain the robustness against cheating
attempts. Figure 4.12 shows the replacement procedure of inconsistent Region
Controllers.
1. We start with a Region Controller that has an incorrect internal state.
The reason for this may be that a malicious client sent a deviating request
or the RC manipulated the state itself. Because of its inconsistent state,
the Region Controller sends incorrect updates to its Game Clients.
2. We assume that the other region controllers work correctly, so they send
correct updates to the Game Clients.
3. After receiving the updates, the Game Clients perform the voting proce-
dure. They detect that the update from the incorrect RC deviates from
the updates sent by the other RCs.
4. The Game Clients request the removal of the Region Controller that sends
incorrect updates.
5. If the Management Service receives enough removal requests, it starts the
RC removal procedure. It sends a message to the Game Clients containing
a notification that this RC is not responsible for them anymore. Since it
is possible that the incorrect RC is not malicious but became inconsis-
tent because of network latency, it informs the RC about its removal and
requests it to stop.
Note that a client will not immediately request the removal of a Region
Controller in all cases. For example, it is possible that a Region Controller
cannot send an update because it has not received all Game Client requests
in time. It is also possible that a Region Controller’s update does not reach
the Game Client in time before it starts its voting procedure. In these cases, a
Game Client will wait a certain number of frames before requesting the RC’s
removal. This gives the inconsistent Region Controller some time so it has the
possibility to catch up and avoid its replacement.
4.6 Scalability
By shifting most of the computational effort and the bandwidth requirements
onto the client side, game publishers can be relieved of the burden of providing
huge amounts of back-end hardware. However, dedicated servers are usually
very powerful machines leaving some scope to scale vertically, i.e. support more
simultaneous users per server. Although most players of computer games possess
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Figure 4.12: Region Controller replacement procedure
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rather powerful computers as well, they cannot compete with high-end server
hardware.
Fortunately, nearly all large-scale online games (i.e. MMOGs) today follow
a different approach. As was mentioned in section 4.3.1, the game world of
MMOGs is split into smaller sized regions which can be hosted on different
servers. We also mentioned the concept of game world instances. These are
special game world regions which are instantiated on demand for groups of
players, which usually have between five and forty members. The partitioning
into regions and instances allow the system to scale horizontally.
This horizontal scalability accommodates our approach. Our system only
limits the amount of players within a single region or instance. This limit is
determined by the computational resources provided by the players’ computers.
To be more precise, the limiting factor is usually the upload bandwidth since
players usually connect to the Internet via asynchronous broadband connections.
In chapter 5 we develop an analytical model that allows us to determine the
possible number of players within a region depending on the players’ Internet
connection. Since regions are nearly independent of each other, the game world
may be composed of an arbitrary number of regions. The only interaction
between regions is the transfer of avatar objects whenever a player wants to
change the region. However, the number of regions an avatar can switch to from
a certain region is limited (usually the surrounding areas) and does not depend
on the total number of game regions. Thus, the number of players entering a
certain region depends only on the number of players per region and not on
the total number of players within the game. Only the resource demand on
the Management Service grows linearly with the total number of players. Since
avatar objects are first transferred from the source region to the Management
Service and then forwarded to the destination region, this server is involved in
every region change.
4.7 General Applicability
In this section we want to point out shortly to what kind of games our approach
can be applied and what the limiting factors are. The focus of our system is
to prevent malicious manipulations of the game’s state. In contrast to attacks
addressed by other approaches (see chapter 2), this kind of attack is relevant to
any kind of game.
Our replication mechanism does not impose any restrictions on the func-
tionality of game objects, so in principle any game design can be realized with
our system. However, in practice the implementation of specific genres may
not result in an enjoyable game experience under certain circumstances. The
critical factor is the rate at which updates of game objects are disseminated
(usually referred to as the frame rate). The frame rate in our system is limited
by the players’ Internet connection and the number of players per region. Thus,
fast-paced action games can only be realized if the player nodes are equipped
with high-bandwidth connections or the number of player per region is kept
low. For a detailed discussion on the connection between the frame rate, the
connection parameters and the number of Game Clients per region please refer
to the following chapter.
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a Peer-to-Peer gaming system that distributes the
management of game state and logic among the nodes of the players. This way
it relieves the game publisher’s servers of this resource intensive task. Although
the state of the game world is managed locally on players’ machines, our system
provides appropriate countermeasures against malicious tampering. For this we
rely on active replication of the game state on the players’ nodes. Since there
exist multiple (probably dissenting) state replicas, the correct one is determined
by a majority voting.
In order to provide scalability, the game world is split into smaller sized
regions which are hosted on player nodes. The assignment of region replicas to
nodes is managed by a central service. This service has to be run by the game
publisher and may also manage player subscriptions (i.e. only allow paying
customers to join the game). Since these regions are nearly independent of each
other, the amount of regions is only limited by what the the central management
service can handle.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Introduction
The probably most important factor for the game experience of networked games
is the speed at which updates of the game world are propagated to the clients.
For fast-paced actions games like First-Person-Shooters (FPS), where players
need to react on changes of their environment quickly (e.g. dodge attacks or
shoot at moving targets), it is crucial that updates of the game world are re-
flected on the client as soon as possible. In contrast to that, games that rely on
long-term planning like Real-Time Strategy Games (RTS) can cope with signif-
icantly higher delays. For example, players of the commercially successful FPS
Quake 3 tend to look for servers where their connection has a delay below a
hundred milliseconds as this gives them a noticeable advantage over players with
higher latencies [3]. Instead, players of the also very successful RTS Warcraft
III can easily live with delays in the range of several seconds [28]. On the one
hand, since the network is a limiting factor, it doesn’t make sense to send up-
dates at a rate higher than the network can handle. On the other, to widen the
range of supported games, we want to keep the time between updates as small
as possible. This chapter discusses how to estimate appropriate update rates
in consideration of parameters like network latency and bandwidth, number of
Game Clients, etc. For this purpose we develop an analytical model which is
later compared to the results of a simulation.
5.2 The Request-Update Cycle
The speed at which updates are sent to the Game Clients is called the frame
rate and is the inverse of the length of a frame. The frame length is the amount
of time that passes between the issuing of a change request by a Game Client
until the reception of an update that reflects the requested change. Figure 5.1
shows what happens in a typical frame on both sides, the Game Client and the
Region Controller, and the network in-between.
As the figure shows, a frame can be divided into three phases:
1. A frame starts with a request phase where each Game Client sends a
request to all Region Controllers. A request contains the desired changes
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Figure 5.1: Sequence of actions within a frame
of the game world that result from a player’s actions (hence they are also
called action requests). These actions are usually determined by input
events like button presses or mouse movements.
2. When a Region Controller has received all requests from the Game Clients,
it may start processing these requests. All requests are validated against
the game rules and the corresponding changes are applied to the game
state. Finally, an update message is generated for each Game Client that
contains only the changes that are relevant for this GC.
3. Each Region Controller sends the generated updates back to the Game
Clients.
Note that reading player input and rendering the game world onto the screen
are usually processes that are performed asynchronously. At first glance it may
seem sensible to read the player input directly after an update has been rendered
to the screen. But due to the human reaction time it may happen (especially
in fast games) that multiple updates may happen before the player actually
reacts. Waiting after each time for the reaction of the player would slow down
the game unnecessarily. Moreover, the rendering of the game world happens
on specialized graphics hardware which runs in parallel to the main processor.
Thus, the screen may get rendered more often than the game world is updated
and both events are usually not synchronized. Updating the screen faster than
the game state can lead to a smoother visualization of the game. E.g. about 25
rendering frames per second are necessary to make a movement look smooth for
the human eye. If the game state itself is updated less frequently, specialized
algorithms are used to interpolate the movement of game objects.
5.3 Correctness
Before we analyze each phase and its execution time in more detail, we have to
define how a correctly executed frame looks like and what kind of errors may
occur.
We first assume that all Game Clients and Region Controllers are working
correctly. At the beginning of a frame, each Game Client sends the same request
to all Region Controllers. After receiving the request from all Game Clients,
each Region Controller processes the requests, updates its state and sends an
update to every GC. These updates are usually individual for each GC, since
they only contain changes that are relevant for this GC.
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A possible source of error is the sending of request messages to the Region
Controllers. In order to arrive at the same state, all Region Controllers must
receive the same requests. Otherwise, the state of a Region Controller may
become inconsistent. There are two causes of inconsistencies:
1. A request arrives too late. Since the network latency is exposed to
a certain amount of jitter, the request may take longer than expected.
Note that a Region Controller cannot simply wait until it has received all
requests. If it would do so, a faulty or malicious GC that never sends
a request would cause the Region Controller to wait forever. Instead,
after a certain timeout has passed, it must start processing the requests
it received so far. If the request arrives later, the Region Controller may
recover by rolling back its state and processing the requests again. In this
case, the inconsistency will exist only for a limited amount of time.
2. A malicious GC sends a deviating (but legal) request or omits
sending a request. This case has been already discussed in the previous
chapter.
Since there is no direct communication between Region Controllers, an RC
cannot detect whether it arrived at a different state as the others. Instead every
Region Controller continues executing frames, assuming that its local state is
the correct one.
After processing all requests, a Region Controller sends an update to each
Game Client. The GC then compares the updates received by the different
Region Controllers. Only at this point, Region Controllers in an inconsistent
state may be detected. As long as the majority of all Region Controllers agrees
on a certain state, inconsistent RCs do not affect the GCs. They can start a
new frame, again sending requests to the RCs. Of course, inconsistent Region
Controllers that cannot recover must be replaced after some time. Otherwise,
more and more RCs may become inconsistent and eventually make it impossible
to achieve a majority. Thus, if a Region Controller has not recovered after
a certain number of frames have passed, the Game Client requests from the
management service to remove the Region Controller. If enough GCs request
the removal of an RC, the management service replaces it with one from the
pool.
In contrast to a real-life system, in a simulation environment it is possible to
inspect the global state of the network at any time. Thus, for each frame we can
directly determine which Region Controllers are in an inconsistent state after
processing requests. This is not only convenient, but necessary to correctly
identify inconsistent RCs. Obviously, not only requests but updates as well
may arrive too late. If a Game Client does not receive an update from a certain
Region Controller in time, it treats the RC as being inconsistent. If the Region
Controller does not send updates for a certain number of frames, the Game
Client assumes that the RC has crashed and requests its removal.
The number of inconsistent Region Controllers within a certain frame is an
appropriate measure of correctness. As long as this number is less than half
of the total number of RCs, a majority can be achieved and the system works
correctly. Obviously, the frame length and the number of inconsistent Region
Controllers are reciprocal. Shorter frame lengths leave less time for transferring
messages, raising the probability that requests arrive too late and thus RCs
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become inconsistent. Bigger frame lengths allow to compensate network jitter
more easily, lowering the chances of an RC becoming inconsistent. In order
to allow a comparison of different scenarios, we also want to know what the
probability is that a majority of RCs become inconsistent within the same frame.
With this probability, we can determine the average time that game needs to
run until a voting failure occurs.
5.4 Frame Execution Time
In order to determine the appropriate length a frame, we must make an estima-
tion of the length of each phase. We start with the second phase, the processing
phase, which is the simplest. At the heart of every computer game engine is a
loop that reads player input, updates the game state accordingly and renders
a visualization on the screen. In order to be playable, the game needs to run
at a certain minimum speed. Thus, the updating of the game state may only
take a limited time. This is the reason why all computer games have certain
minimum hardware requirements. If the requirements are not met, the game
runs too slow and is simply not playable. But if the hardware exceeds the
performance requirements, the game should not run faster. Instead, either the
additional performance may be used to perform smaller updates at a higher
rate (leading to a smoother game experience) or to more idle time that may be
used by other processes running on the machine. Thus, the time needed for the
processing phase is the maximum time required for processing all updates on
a Region Controller. If a Region Controller needs less time updating its game
state, it could immediately start sending updates to the Game Clients. This
doesn’t lead to shorter frames since the GC needs to wait until the other RCs
sent their updates. But sending earlier leaves more time for the transmission of
the update messages, which lowers the probability that updates arrive too late
because of network jitter. In the model and the simulator we use a fixed time
interval for the processing phase. Implementing and analyzing the benefits of
advanced update sending is left as future work.
Estimating the lengths of the first and the third phase is more complex.
The time that it takes to send the necessary messages depends on many fac-
tors. First, the number of Game Clients and Region Controllers determines the
number of request and update messages that need to be sent. Next, the number
of messages and their size determine the amount of data which is transmitted.
Finally, the amount of data, the available bandwidth on the link between two
nodes and the network latency determine the transmission time. Unfortunately,
the network delay is not fixed but shows a certain variance, called the net-
work jitter. A mathematical model that pays respect to all of these factors is
presented in the following.
5.4.1 Modeling Message Transmission Time
In this section we develop a model that allows us to estimate the amount of time
that is necessary for transferring a certain amount of messages over a network.
This model is then used to determine the length of the request and update
phases of a frame. The message transmission time, i.e. the time to transmit
a message from one node to another, is the sum of the transmission delay and
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the propagation delay. The transmission delay is the time that elapses between
the arrival of the first and the last bit of information at the receiving node. The
propagation delay is the amount of time that elapses between the point when
the first bit of information is sent by the sending node until the point when it
arrives at the receiving node.
5.4.2 Transmission Delay
The transmission delay can be determined by dividing the amount of transmit-
ted information by the available bandwidth. The available bandwidth itself is
determined by the slowest link between the sending and the receiving node. In
our model the connection between two nodes consists of three links: the sender’s
upload link, the intermediate network and the receiver’s download link. The
bandwidths of the upload and download links are fixed. However, determining
the available bandwidth of the intermediate network is not trivial. One has to
take into account that the maximum available bandwidth is affected by packet
loss and, since we apply the TCP protocol, effects of the TCP Congestion Avoid-
ance algorithm [55, 94]. Mathis et al. [67] have shown, through simulation and
live observations, that equation 5.1 is an adequate model to predict bandwidth
under these conditions.
Bandwidth =
MTU
RTT
√
3/2
p
(5.1)
MTU The maximum transfer unit (in our simulation the MTU is 1500 Bytes).
RTT The average roundtrip time between the sending and the receiving node.
p The random packet loss probability.
Using commonly available ADSL lines, the uplink is usually the slowest link and
thus determines the overall bandwidth.
After determining the available bandwidth, we can calculate the time that
is necessary for the message transfer. Dividing the total amount of transmitted
information by the available bandwidth, as described above, yields only the
amount of time that passes until all messages have arrived at the receiver. But
as we will see later, it is necessary to determine the arrival time of every single
message. From an abstract point of view, all requests are sent at the same time.
But on the network level, packets are sent sequentially and not truly in parallel.
Fortunately, all request and update messages used by our system fit into a single
packet. Thus, we do not have to worry whether packets of different messages
are interleaved during the transmission. Since our simulator assumes a packet
overhead of 40 bytes (20 bytes TCP header plus 20 bytes IP header) the size of
a message Sizem is determined by equation 5.2 where Payloadm is the payload
the message contains.
Sizem = Payloadm +
(⌈
Payloadm
MTU − 40
⌉
∗ 40
)
(5.2)
But in case that the payload fits into a single packet the equation is reduced to
equation 5.3.
Sizem = Payloadm + 40 (5.3)
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The transmission delay TransDelaym of a single message is
TransDelaym =
Sizem
Bandwidth
(5.4)
and the time TransDelaymi that passes from sending the first message until
the ith message arrives at the receiver can be calculated as follows:
TransDelaymi = i ∗ TransDelaym (5.5)
5.4.3 Propagation Delay
The propagation delay is the sum of time that the information takes to travel
over the physical medium and the propagation and queueing delays on inter-
mediate routers. It may be split into a fixed part, the minimum propagation
delay, and a random part, the jitter. The random part obviously cannot be
calculated by a function that returns a single value. Instead, it can be modeled
by a log-normal distribution function [51] which gives the probability distribu-
tion of the jitter values. The corresponding cumulative distribution function
allows us to determine the probability that the jitter stays within a given value.
Equation 5.6 shows the log-normal probability density function and equation
5.7 the cumulative distribution function.
f1(x;µ, σ) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e−
ln(x)− µ)2
2σ2
(5.6)
f2(x;µ, σ) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf
[
ln(x)− µ
σ
√
2
]
(5.7)
The parameters µ and σ can be fitted with a downhill simplex algorithm [78]
using real data from the PingER project. Note that x in f2(x;µ, σ) is the jitter
of a roundtrip packet. Assuming that the roundtrip jitter is equally distributed
on both hops, the probability that a single-hop jitter is less or equal than x can
be calculated with f2(2x;µ, σ).
5.4.4 Total Message Transmission Time
The time that it takes to transmit a message mi, is the sum of the transmission
delay (see equation 5.5), the propagation delay and the jitter:
TransT imemi = TransDelaymi + PropDelay + Jitter
5.4.5 Probability of an Inconsistency
In order to arrive in time, the transmission time of a message must be smaller
than the time interval reserved for the request phase:
TransT imemi ≤ ReqInt
⇔ TransDelaymi + PropDelay + Jitter ≤ ReqInt
⇔ Jitter ≤ ReqInt− TransDelaymi − PropDelay
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Using f2(2x;µ, σ) (see equation 5.7) we can determine the probability that
the one-way jitter is less or equal than a certain value x. The probability
PInTime(mi) that message mi arrives at the receiver in time is
PInTime(mi) = f2(2 ∗ (ReqInt− TransDelaymi − PropDelay);µ, σ) (5.8)
Remember that the number of request sent by a single Game Client is different
from the number of request received by a Region Controller. Therefore we first
need to calculate the average probability that any single request arrives in time.
Then we can derive the probability for any Region Controller being inconsistent
in a certain frame. The average probability for any single request out of n to
arrive in time is
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 PInTime(mi)
n
(5.9)
The probability that all r requests sent to a region in a frame arrive in time is
P (InT imeall) = P (InT imem)r (5.10)
Therefore, the probability that any of the requests in a frame does not arrive in
time at a certain Region Controller and thus causes this RC to be inconsistent
is
P (RCInconsistent) = 1− P (InT imeall) (5.11)
To determine the number of inconsistencies that occur within a certain time, we
have to multiply P (RCInconsistent) with the number of active RCs per frame
and the number of frames that are executed within the amount of time. Finally,
we determine the probability that the voting fails because no majority can be
achieved in a certain frame. In order to make the voting fail, more than half of
the active RCs need to be inconsistent. If r is the number of active RCs, then
equation 5.12 determines the probability of a voting failure occurring within any
frame.
P (V otingFailure) =
r∑
i=b r2+1c
P (RCInconsistent)i (5.12)
5.5 Simulation Setup
As our simulation environment, we use PeerfactSim.KOM [63] which is a
discrete-event based Peer-to-Peer simulator written in Java. The main goal
of PeerfactSim.KOM is to provide a general benchmarking platform for P2P
systems. Its architecture consists of multiple layers and each of these layers
encapsulates an important aspect of a P2P system. For example, the simulator
supports the modeling of user behavior, application logic and overlay networks.
But the main reason for choosing PeerfactSim.KOM is that it provides an accu-
rate latency model for simulating message delivery times for the Internet. This
model accounts for details of the OSI layers that have to be traversed when send-
ing messages over end-to-end connections. These details include geographical
distance between peers, processing delays, congestion, packet loss and retrans-
mission. Real-life data from the CAIDA Macroscopic Topology Measurements
Project [19] and the Ping End-to-end Reporting Project (PingER) [68] is used
to simulate the realistic network delays which also include jitter. The validity
of the simulator’s latency model has been proven in [48].
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On the application layer of the simulator, we implemented the system that
has been presented in the previous chapter. All necessary services — Game
Clients, Region Controllers and the Management Service — have been imple-
mented as an application. Each player node runs both, the GC and RC appli-
cation, while the Management Service runs on a separate node. All important
interactions presented in chapter 4 have been implemented exactly as described.
The bootstrapping, the login and logout of Game Clients and Region Controllers
as well as the replacement procedure for inconsistent RCs.
Each simulation run starts with a small warm-up phase. In this phase,
initial Region Controller instances are provided on separate nodes as described
in section 4.4.1. As soon as regular player nodes join the system, the initial RC
instances are successively replaced by RC instances that run on a player node.
When all Region Controllers are hosted on player nodes, the actual simulation
phase starts and lasts for approximately one hour of real-time. Naturally, the
shorter the frame length is, the more frames can be executed within a certain
time period. However, since we want to determine the mean time between
voting failures, we keep the simulated real-time period fixed. All scenarios were
simulated fifteen times using different random seeds.
All player nodes modeled in the simulator emulate the bandwidths of real
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) connections available from German Internet
providers. We start with a widely available 2 MBit ADSL connection and con-
tinue with the faster but less commonly available 16 MBit ADSL connection.
We conclude our scenarios with a high speed 50 MBit VDSL connection which
at the moment is only available in certain cities. But we still talk about con-
nections that are already available to regular customers.
As we increase the nodes’ bandwidth, we first retain the number of Game
Clients to see how the faster connection affects the possible frame length and
the mean time between voting failures. We then increase the number of clients
within a region to show how faster connections can handle larger region sizes.
The number of Game Clients is increased from 25 to 100 and finally to 250. The
number of Region Controllers is maintained through all scenarios since we want
to keep the degree of replication equal.
The last value that is changed between different scenarios is the buffer time.
As described above, the length of the request and update phases are determined
by the time needed to transfer the request and update messages respectively.
However, due to the network jitter there is a certain probability that the message
transfer takes longer than expected. For this reason, we extend each phase by
a certain buffer time. The larger this buffer time is, the less is the probability
that the message transfer exceeds the phase length. As we will see in the second
scenario, shorter frame lengths (which are possible on faster connections) lead to
significantly smaller mean times between voting failures. Thus, in order to keep
these mean times tolerable, we increase the buffer times whenever the frame
lengths become smaller.
In the following section we start with the first scenario which also serves as an
example of how our model can be used to predict the results of the simulation. In
section 5.6, we extend our simulation with clock skew, node churn and crashes to
achieve more realism. Finally, in section 5.7 we discuss the remaining scenarios.
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5.5.1 Scenario 1 - 2 MBit ADSL Node, 25 Game Clients
We will now give an example how the model can be used to predict the results of
the simulation. The following table gives an overview of the main parameters.
Number of GCs per Region 25
Maximum number of RCs 7
Node download bandwidth 2 MBit/s
Node upload bandwidth 192 KBit/s
GC Request Size 60 Bytes
RC Update Size 300 Bytes
RC processing time 100 ms
Buffer time 20ms
Node location Germany
Simulation length 6921 Frames
This setting uses standard 2MBit ADSL nodes running a region with 25
Game Clients. This is a typical size for instance raid dungeons in online games.
According to [40], the maximum packet sizes for updates are around 300 Bytes,
while the maximum request size is about 60 Bytes. We assume that a RC needs
at most a hundred milliseconds to update its state according to the GC requests.
We add 20 ms as buffer time to both, the request and the update phases, to
compensate for the network jitter. A maximum number of seven RCs means
that there need to be at least four colluding malicious RCs within the same
region in order to manipulate its state. We assume that all nodes are located
within Germany. For these node PingER states a minimum roundtrip time of
6.0 ms and a one-way packet loss rate of 0.005 percent. The simulation ran for
6921 frames, not including the warm-up phase, simulating approximately one
hour of real-time.
We start with estimating the amount of time that should be reserved for the
request phase. In this phase, every Game Client sends seven requests to the
Region Controllers and every Region Controller receives 25 requests from the
GCs. Because the number of messages on the uplink is not the same as on the
downlink, we cannot simply compare the bandwidths of both links. Instead, we
have to calculate the time it takes to transfer all messages on each link and see
on which link it takes longer. Formula 5.2 yields a total request message size of
100 Bytes.
60 +
(⌈
60
1460
⌉
∗ 40
)
= 100
Transferring seven messages over the uplink of the Game Client takes approxi-
mately 28 ms.
7 ∗ 100Bytes
192KBit/s
=
700Bytes
24576Bytes/s
= 0.02848s
Transferring 25 requests over the downlink of a Region Controller takes approx-
imately 10 ms.
25 ∗ 100Bytes
2MBit/s
=
2500Bytes
262144Bytes/s
= 0.00954s
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Formula 5.1 yields that the network between those two nodes can easily transfer
data above a rate of 250 MBit/s.
1500Bytes
7.68ms
√
3/2
0.00005
= 258.1MBit/s
As a result, the limiting link for sending requests is the uplink of the GC and
thus determines the transmission delay.
To the transmission delay of the request messages we have to add the prop-
agation delay, which itself is the sum of the minimum propagation delay and
the jitter. The minimum propagation delay is equal to half of the minimum
roundtrip time, i.e. 3 ms. As mentioned before, the jitter is not a fixed value.
The only thing we can do is add a certain buffer time to compensate for the
jitter and calculate the probability that the requests will arrive within that time.
We add the additional 20 ms buffer time and round the result to the next full
millisecond.
28.48ms+ 3ms+ 20ms = 51.48ms
This means that for our request phase we chose a length of 51 ms.
The length of the update phase is estimated in the same manner. Formula
5.2 yields a total update message size of 340 Bytes.
300 +
(⌈
300
1460
⌉
∗ 40
)
= 340
Transferring 25 updates over the uplink of the Region Controller takes approx-
imately 346 ms.
25 ∗ 340Bytes
192KBit/s
=
8500Bytes
24576Bytes/s
= 0.34587s
Transferring seven requests over the downlink of a GC takes approximately 9
ms.
7 ∗ 340Bytes
2MBit/s
=
2380Bytes
262144Bytes/s
= 0.00908s
Again, the limiting link is the uplink. We add the minimum propagation delay
and the buffer time and get a rounded update phase length of 369ms.
345.87ms+ 3ms+ 20ms = 368.87ms
The total frame length is the sum of the request, processing and update
phase lengths:
51ms+ 100ms+ 369ms = 520ms
In order to determine the probability of inconsistencies to occur, we first need
to fit the parameters µ and σ for equation 5.7 to determine the distribution of the
network jitter. We apply the downhill simplex algorithm mentioned above using
real-life data from the PingER project. The algorithm yields the parameters
µ = 0.07776 and σ = 1.08218.Figure 5.2(a) shows the probability density for
the real data measured by PingER and for the approximated function. Figure
5.2(b) shows the cumulative distribution for the approximated function.
Using equation 5.8, we can determine the probability that a request sent by
a GC within a certain frame arrives in time. The length of the request phase
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(a) Realistic and approximated probability density
function
(b) Approximated cumulative distribution func-
tion
Figure 5.2: Density and distribution function for the network jitter
ReqInt is 51 ms, the propagation delay PropDelay 3 ms and the transmis-
sion delay TransDelaym1 for the first message m1 is 4.07 ms. Therefore, the
probability of arriving in time is for the first message
PInTime(m1) = f2(2 ∗ (51ms− 4.07ms− 3ms);µ, σ) = 0.99998
The second message has a transmission delay of 8.14 ms, the third of 12.21 ms
and so on. The probabilities of arriving in time for the messages m2 to m7 (each
GC sends 7 requests) are
PInTime(m2) = 0.99996
PInTime(m3) = 0.99994
PInTime(m4) = 0.99992
PInTime(m5) = 0.99986
PInTime(m6) = 0.99976
PInTime(m7) = 0.99954
The average probability for any single request to arrive in time (equation 5.9)
is therefore
P (InT imem) = 0.99985
This means that during 6921 frames, where in each 25 Game Clients send 7
requests, on average 6921 ∗ 25 ∗ 7 ∗ (1 − 0.99985) = 179.33253 requests are too
late. The probability for any Region Controller (each of them receives r = 25
requests) being inconsistent (equations 5.10 and 5.11) in a frame is
P (RCInconsistent) = 1− P (InT imem)r = 1− (0.99985)25 = 0.00370
Having 7 Region Controllers running for 6921 frames means that, on average,
approximately 179.01426 inconsistencies occur. Note that the average number
of inconsistencies is slightly less than the average number of delayed requests.
This is because there is a small probability that multiple requests arrive too
late at the same RC within the same frame, causing only a single inconsistency.
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 182 182
2 174 172
3 192 191
4 148 148
5 193 193
6 183 181
7 186 186
8 186 186
9 193 192
10 176 174
11 174 174
12 186 183
13 163 161
14 182 181
15 177 177
Average 179.6667 178.7333
Expected 179.3325 179.0142
Table 5.1: Simulation results for scenario 1
Finally, the probability that a voting failure within any frame occurs (equation
5.12) is
P (V otingFailure) =
7∑
i=4
0.00370i = 1.87107 ∗ 10−10
This means, that within 5.345 billion frames (approximately 88 years) only a
single voting failure will occur.
In order to compare the results of the model to those of the simulation, we
performed the simulation with the parameters above fifteen times using each
time a different random seed. The results are shown in table 5.1. If we take
the average result of the simulation as the reference, the error of the model is
only 0.00186 for the number of delayed requests and 0.00157 for the number of
inconsistent RCs.
5.6 Adding Realism to Scenario 1
Up to now we have only simulated the system being in an ideal state. No nodes
join or leave the system, no nodes crash and all clocks are perfectly synchronized.
We now extend our simulation with node churn, node crashes and clock skew
and see how each of these extensions affects the correctness of the system.
5.6.1 Clock Skew
Our system relies on the fact that tasks are performed at certain times. For
example, the Game Clients start to send requests at the beginning of the re-
quest phase and the Region Controllers start processing these requests at the
beginning of the processing phase. Unfortunately, the clocks on different nodes
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usually don’t show exactly the same time. If the clock on a GC is late, then the
sending of requests will also happen later (with respect to some reference time).
If the clock on a Region Controller is ahead of time, it will start processing
requests earlier. In both cases, the time that is left for sending the requests is
shorter than intended. This may raise the probability that requests arrive too
late and therefore more RCs may become inconsistent.
Many different approaches for synchronizing the clocks of nodes in a dis-
tributed system exist. For example, by using the Global Positioning System
(GPS) clocks can be synchronized with an error of 10 nanoseconds and less
[91, 30]. GPS uses a multitude of satellites that emit a radio signal which can
be received by a special GPS receiver device. Out of the different signals, the
receiver can calculate its own position and the current UTC time. GPS receivers
have become affordable and are widely-used in civil vehicles today as naviga-
tional aids. There exist also many purely software-based solutions. In [101] a
synchronization method based on the TimeStamp Counter (TSC) register which
is found in nearly all modern CPUs. This register simply counts clock cycles of
the CPU. Because CPU oscillators show a very high stability, it is possible to
synchronize clocks with a precision in the order of 30 microseconds. Another
TSC-based approach is presented in [84] and provides an even better accuracy
of about one microsecond.
All approaches mentioned above exhibit an offset that is well below a mil-
lisecond and thus could easily be ignored by our system. However, the most
popular synchronization method that is used today is the Network Time Pro-
tocol (NTP). NTP uses special time servers that are queried by the network
nodes. Its accuracy is bounded by the round-trip time between the time server
and the node and lies usually in the order of 15 milliseconds and less on Inter-
net connections [73]. In order to measure the actual performance of the NTP
synchronization, we have used the standard NTP query program ntpq. On a
standard ADSL node with 2 MBit downlink and 192 KBit uplink that was
connected to three different time servers, we collected nearly ten thousand sam-
ples of the clock offset. The samples were normally distributed with a mean
of 0.00020224 and a standard deviation of 0.9437702. Figure 5.6.1 shows the
distribution of the offset samples.
Our simulator uses this normal distribution to generate offsets for the clocks
on the nodes. Every time a node schedules an event to proceed to the next
phase (e.g. form the request phase to the processing phase) a value from this
distribution is added to the scheduling time. Note that this is a worst case
scenario: because the random offsets are independent from each other, it can
change instantly from a high negative offset to a high positive one. In reality,
it is very unlikely that the offset performs large jumps.
Table 5.2 shows the results of the simulation runs.
As we can see, the average number of delayed requests did not change sig-
nificantly. This is because we measure if the network transmission time of the
requests exceeds the request phase and not if the request arrives too late at the
receiver. On the contrary, the number of RC consistencies reflects which RCs
became inconsistent because of requests that arrived too late. It does not mat-
ter whether the request was delayed on the network or the request was sent too
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of NTP time offset samples
late because the senders clock is late. This explains why the number of inconsis-
tencies may actually be higher than the number of delayed requests. The prob-
ability of a Region Controller being inconsistent per frame is 181.13336921∗7 = 0.00374.
Consequently, the probability of a voting failure per frame is raised
7∑
i=4
0.00374i = 1.96134 ∗ 10−10
and results in one voting failure in 84.1 years on average.
5.6.2 Node Churn
The next extension to our simulator is the joining and leaving of nodes while
the system is running. Depending on the type of game, the churn patterns can
be very different. For example, in Real-Time-Strategy Games the situation is
similar to a board game. Players usually come together to play one or more
sessions of the game and during a session, players rarely leave. Whenever a
game session is finished, its state is discarded and the next session starts from
scratch. In a Massively Multiplayer Online Game there is usually a persistent
world which is continuously online for years. There are no sessions with a
restricted lifetime and players enter and leave the world whenever they like.
To our simulator we added the more challenging churn pattern of an MMOG.
In [39], a 3-year long-term study of the MMOG EVE Online [21] was performed.
During this time, it had nearly one million unique players, 67 million player ses-
sions and 17 thousand player years of gameplay. The authors show that the
player session times can be modeled with a Weibull distribution with the pa-
rameters β = 0.456 and η = 11.7. Figure 5.4 shows a plot of this distribution.
For our simulation, all session times were generated according to this distribu-
tion. In order to keep the utilization of the system always close to the maximum,
every node that logs out of the system is replaced shortly after.
Of course we expect that node churn has a negative impact on the correctness
of the system.If the node that had left was an active Region Controller, an
inactive one from the pool has to take its place. The remaining active RCs
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 149 152
2 186 191
3 173 178
4 174 171
5 161 168
6 182 184
7 188 189
8 182 188
9 193 187
10 186 193
11 183 183
12 195 200
13 175 179
14 188 187
15 203 197
Average 181.2000 181.1333
Expected 179.3325 179.0142
Table 5.2: Simulation results for scenario 1 including clock skew
provide the new one with the current region state. This takes away a fraction
of the bandwidth and thus may lead to slightly more delayed request messages.
The system could be improved in such a way that it interrupts the sending of
the region state during the request phase. However, the replacement of Region
Controllers would then also take more time.
Regarding correctness, it doesn’t matter whether a Region Controller is in-
consistent or not available. In both cases, the number of consistent RCs is
lowered by one, raising the probability of a voting failure. We need to esti-
mate how many active RCs leave within a certain time and how long it takes
to replace them. The churn pattern, generated using the session time distri-
bution function, reveals that of all nodes that leave during the simulation on
average eighteen are active RCs.To replace an active Region Controller, the
new RC needs to be informed about the current state. As described in sec-
tion 4.5.5, the remaining RCs each send a message that contains the current
state. Thus, the time the replacement takes corresponds to the time that this
message needs to be transferred. In our scenario, the upload link of the send-
ing RC is the limiting factor. However, not the whole bandwidth is available
for sending. During the update phase, the RC also needs to send its updates
to the Game Clients. As shown above, the sending of 25 update messages re-
sults in a total of 8500 Bytes. A frame has a length of 520ms and the upload
bandwidth of the RC is 24576Bytes/s. Within a frame, an RC can upload
24576Bytes/s∗520ms = 12780Bytes. For sending the state message, per frame
12780Bytes − 8500Bytes = 4280Bytes remain. In our simulation we assume
that the state is represented by 1024Bytes per player, so we end up with
1024Bytes ∗ 25
4280Bytes/Frame
= 5.9813
frames to replace an active RCs. It takes 5.9813 frames on average to replace an
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of player session times
RC with one from the pool, so we have 18 ∗ 5.9813 = 107.6634 frames in total
where an additional inconsistency occurs. We add this number to the 179.0142
inconsistencies that the model predicts due to delayed messages and end up with
179.0142 + 107.6634 = 286.6776 inconsistencies. Table 5.3 shows the results of
the simulation runs.
It may seem surprising that the number of delayed requests is smaller than
in the ideal world setting. To explain this, we must remember that the system
in this scenario is not always fully utilized. Whenever a node leaves, we wait
for approximately one minute of real-time until it is replaced by a new one.
During this time, fewer Game Client requests are sent compared to the ideal
scenario with no churn. Analyzing the log files of the simulation runs reveals
that the system sends about 4.79 percent less request messages. Assuming that
the number of delayed requests is also proportionally lower, we would expect on
average 179.3325 ∗ 0.9621 = 170.7493 delayed requests. However, as explained
above, the actual number is slightly higher due to the bandwidth consumption
of the RC initialization messages. Of course, the smaller number of delayed
requests leads also to less inconsistencies than expected. The probability of a
Region Controller being inconsistent per frame is 286.67766921∗7 = 0.00578. Finally,
probability of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00578i = 1.12009 ∗ 10−9
and results in one voting failure in 14.7 years on average. As we can see, adding
churn significantly reduces the time between voting failures, but they still remain
a very rare occasion.
5.6.3 Node crashes
In a realistic system, nodes do not always leave the system cleanly. They may
crash and hence stop sending messages to other nodes. We thus extend the
above node churn scenario with nodes that crash in a fail-stop manner. Since we
could not find any real-life data on the probability of node crashes, we assumed
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 164 272
2 194 301
3 195 300
4 155 262
5 184 290
6 176 279
7 171 276
8 179 285
9 172 276
10 170 273
11 158 262
12 179 283
13 171 275
14 179 287
15 172 277
Average 174.6000 279.8667
Expected 179.3325 286.6776
Table 5.3: Simulation results for scenario 1 including node churn
that ten percent of the leaving nodes do so without correctly unregistering
themselves. Note that this is a very pessimistic assumption, we believe that
this crash rate is most likely an order of magnitude larger than in a real system.
We expect the system to produce somewhat more inconsistencies than in
the example above. The churn rate itself is the same, but since ten percent of
the leaving nodes do not unregister themselves correctly it takes more time to
replace them. Like in the scenario above, only nodes that were active Region
Controllers at the time of their crashing affect the correctness of the system.
Game Clients notice crashed RCs because they do not receive updates from
them. After a certain timeout, the GC requests the removal of the RC at the
management service. This timeout is a configuration parameter and set to three
frames for our simulation. If the manager receives a certain amount (again, a
configuration parameter which is usually set to the same value as the minimum
number of RCs that are necessary for a majority vote) of such requests, it
triggers the replacement process for the RC. On average, 1.8 nodes that crash
are active RCs, resulting in 3 ∗ 1.8 = 5.4 additional inconsistencies.
Table 5.4 shows the results of the simulation. As before, missing Region
Controllers are treated as inconsistent. The number of delayed messages is
nearly the same as in the scenario before. However, because the replacement of a
crashed active RC takes three frames longer due to the replacement timeout, the
number of inconsistencies grows slightly. The probability of a Region Controller
being inconsistent per frame is 288.66676921∗7 = 0.00596. Consequently, the probability
of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00596i = 1.26799 ∗ 10−9
and results in one voting failure in 13.0 years on average.
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 168 281
2 182 298
3 186 302
4 161 276
5 185 298
6 166 276
7 163 278
8 165 278
9 170 283
10 181 295
11 192 307
12 189 304
13 167 283
14 174 290
15 166 281
Average 174.3333 288.6667
Expected 179.3325 292.0776
Table 5.4: Simulation results for scenario 1 including node churn and node
crashes
5.6.4 Combination of all extensions
Finally, we performed the simulation including all three extensions described
above. Table 5.5 shows the results of the simulation.
As expected, the number of delayed requests is nearly the same as in the last
example. The additional clock skew has no effect on this number as explained
in section 5.6.1. The number of Region Controller inconsistencies increases
slightly, but not as significantly as from the first to the second scenario. The
small effect of the clock skew submerges in the huge effect of the node churn.
The probability of a Region Controller being inconsistent per frame is 290.33336921∗7 =
0.00599. Finally, the probability of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00599i = 1.29757 ∗ 10−9
and results in one voting failure in 12.7 years on average.
5.7 Further Scenarios
In this section, we analyzed different scenarios using nodes with varying band-
widths. The given up- and download bandwidths are realistic numbers based
on current offerings by German Internet providers. As before, all scenarios are
simulated for one hour of real-time. Obviously, if we keep the simulation length
fixed, shorter frame lengths lead to a higher number of frames per simulation
run. This means that the number of delayed requests and Region Controller
inconsistencies also grows and thus these figures cannot be directly compared to
those of the other scenarios. In order to compare different scenarios one must
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 176 282
2 166 288
3 188 311
4 157 282
5 182 298
6 172 285
7 163 287
8 178 291
9 173 284
10 189 293
11 193 301
12 185 301
13 168 287
14 185 304
15 150 261
Average 175.0000 290.3333
Expected 179.3325 292.0776
Table 5.5: Simulation results for scenario 1 including clock skew, node churn
and node crashes
look at the mean times between voting failures which are given at the end of
each scenario.
5.7.1 Scenario 2 - 16 MBit ADSL Node, 25 Game Clients
This scenario is identical to the first one, except that we use a standard 16 MBit
ADSL node.
Number of GCs per Region 25
Maximum number of RCs 7
Node download bandwidth 16 MBit/s
Node upload bandwidth 1 MBit/s
GC Request Size 60 Bytes
RC Update Size 300 Bytes
RC processing time 100 ms
Buffer time 20ms
Node location Germany
Simulation length 16662 Frames
First, we use our model to predict the results of the ideal world setting. For
the sending of requests, we get
7 ∗ 100Bytes
1MBit/s
=
700Bytes
131072Bytes/s
= 0.00534s
for the upload and
25 ∗ 100Bytes
16MBit/s
=
2500Bytes
2097152Bytes/s
= 0.00119s
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for the download. For the sending of updates, we get
25 ∗ 340Bytes
1MBit/s
=
8500Bytes
131072Bytes/s
= 0.06485s
and
7 ∗ 340Bytes
16MBit/s
=
2380Bytes
2097152Bytes/s
= 0.00405s
respectively. In both cases the upload link is the limiting factor. We round the
transmission times, add the buffer time and the minimum propagation delay to
each of the two phases. Finally, we add the processing time, resulting in a frame
length of
(5ms+ 20ms+ 3ms) + 100ms+ (65ms+ 20ms+ 3ms) = 216ms
To speed up the calculation of the average probability of a request message
to arrive in time, we derive a single equation. First, we combine equations 5.8
and 5.9:
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (ReqInt− TransDelaymi − PropDelay);µ, σ)
n
Next, to calculate TransDelaymi , we use equation 5.5 and end up with
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (ReqInt− (i ∗ TransDelaym)− PropDelay);µ, σ)
n
The size of the request interval ReqInt is 28ms, the minimum propagation delay
PropDelay is 3ms and the transmission delay of a single message TransDelaym
can be calculated using equation 5.4:
TransDelaymi = i ∗ TransDelaym = i ∗
100Bytes
1MBit/s
= i ∗ 0.76294ms
Since we send n = 7 requests, we end up with
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (28− (i ∗ 0.76294)− 3);µ, σ)
7
= 0.99968
The probability for any single request to arrive in time is 0.99968, which
means that on average 935.1887 requests will be too late. The probability for
any Region Controller being inconsistent in a frame is
1− 0.9996825 = 0.00799
so we get 931.9057 inconsistencies on average. Finally, the probability that a
voting failure within any frame occurs is
7∑
i=4
0.00799i = 4.10296 ∗ 10−9
meaning that every 1.7 years a voting failure will occur. This is a surprisingly
small time compared to our first setting. A small difference of 0.00018 in the
probability of a single request to arrive in time doubles the probability of a
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 949 945
2 973 969
3 935 931
4 891 886
5 924 920
6 937 932
7 901 895
8 912 911
9 964 962
10 942 938
11 943 938
12 899 894
13 961 959
14 933 930
15 953 948
Average 934.4667 930.5333
Expected 935.1887 931.9057
Table 5.6: Simulation results for scenario 2 with ideal-world setting and 20ms
buffer
single RC becoming inconsistent. Hereupon the probability of a voting failure is
increased nearly by the factor 22, leading to a comparatively short time between
voting failures. Table 5.6 shows the results of the corresponding simulation runs.
In order to lower the probability of a voting failure, we repeated the experi-
ment with an increased buffer time. Raising the buffer time to 25ms, resulting
in a total frame length of 226ms, showed the desired results. The number of
delayed requests decreases to an average of 433.2808, the number of inconsisten-
cies to 432.4733. This leads to one voting failure in about 31.5 years on average.
Table 5.7 shows the results of the simulation runs with an extended buffer time
of 25ms.
We repeated the simulation in the real-world setting, including node churn,
crashes and clock skew. Since we have the same number of nodes and the the
same amount of simulated real time, the average number of leaving and crashing
nodes is the same as before.
In the 20ms buffer scenario, a frame has a length of 216ms. The upload
bandwidth of the RC is 131072Bytes/s, so within a frame an RC can upload
131072Bytes/s ∗ 216ms = 28312Bytes. For sending the state message, per
frame 28312Bytes − 8500Bytes = 19812Bytes remain and the sending of the
state takes
1024Bytes ∗ 25
19812Bytes/Frame
= 1.2921
frames on average. Since eighteen RCs need to be replaced of which ten percent
crash, we end up with 18 ∗ 1.2921 + 5.4 = 28.6578 additional inconsistencies.
In the 25ms buffer scenario, a frame has a length of 226ms. Within a frame,
an RC can upload 131072Bytes/s∗226ms = 29622Bytes. For sending the state
message, per frame 29622Bytes − 8500Bytes = 21122Bytes remain and the
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 427 425
2 460 459
3 449 448
4 418 416
5 443 440
6 433 432
7 437 431
8 427 423
9 423 422
10 416 411
11 432 432
12 428 426
13 454 451
14 429 428
15 411 407
Average 432.4667 430.0667
Expected 433.2808 432.4732
Table 5.7: Simulation results for scenario 2 with ideal-world setting and 25ms
buffer
sending of the state takes
1024Bytes ∗ 25
21122Bytes/Frame
= 1.2120
frames on average and we end up with 18 ∗ 1.2120 + 5.4 = 27.2160 additional
inconsistencies.
The results are shown in table 5.8 for the setting with 20ms buffer time
and table 5.9 for 25ms buffer time respectively. The probability of a Region
Controller being inconsistent per frame is in the first setting 943.266716662∗7 = 0.00809.
The probability of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00809i = 4.31285 ∗ 10−9
and results in one voting failure in 1.6 years on average. For the second setting,
the probability of a Region Controller being inconsistent per frame is 459.689215925∗7 =
0.00412. The probability of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00412i = 2.90363 ∗ 10−10
and results in one voting failure in 24.7 years on average.
5.7.2 Scenario 3 - 16 MBit ADSL Node, 100 Game Clients
We use the same ADSL nodes as in the last scenario, but now extend the number
of Game Clients per region to one hundred. Because of the high number of GCs,
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 952 979
2 880 905
3 938 965
4 945 971
5 905 930
6 941 967
7 905 933
8 933 960
9 908 934
10 933 960
11 938 962
12 849 874
13 926 951
14 881 907
15 925 951
Average 917.2666 943.2667
Expected 935.1887 960.5635
Table 5.8: Simulation results for scenario 2 with real-world setting and 20ms
buffer
Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 454 478
2 411 432
3 431 452
4 449 473
5 402 423
6 432 454
7 434 455
8 423 448
9 453 477
10 390 413
11 435 457
12 431 455
13 436 458
14 442 463
15 401 424
Average 428.2667 450.8000
Expected 433.2808 459.6892
Table 5.9: Simulation results for scenario 2 with real-world setting and 25ms
buffer
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we further increase the buffer time by 10ms to keep the number of inconsistencies
low.
Number of GCs per Region 100
Maximum number of RCs 7
Node download bandwidth 16 MBit/s
Node upload bandwidth 1 MBit/s
GC Request Size 60 Bytes
RC Update Size 300 Bytes
RC processing time 100 ms
Buffer time 35ms
Node location Germany
Simulation length 8179 Frames
For the sending of requests, our model yields
7 ∗ 100Bytes
1MBit/s
=
700Bytes
131072Bytes/s
= 0.00534s
for the upload and
100 ∗ 100Bytes
16MBit/s
=
10000Bytes
2097152Bytes/s
= 0.00477s
for the download. For the sending of updates, we get
100 ∗ 340Bytes
1MBit/s
=
34000Bytes
131072Bytes/s
= 0.25940s
and
7 ∗ 340Bytes
16MBit/s
=
2380Bytes
2097152Bytes/s
= 0.00405s
respectively. As before, in both cases the upload link is the limiting factor. For
the frame length we get
(5ms+ 35ms+ 3ms) + 100ms+ (259ms+ 35ms+ 3ms) = 440ms
The probability for any single request to arrive in time is
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (43− (i ∗ 0.76294)− 3);µ, σ)
7
= 0.99995
so on average 274.8737 requests will be too late. The probability for any Region
Controller being inconsistent in a frame is
1− 0.99995100 = 0.00479
so we get 274.2215 inconsistencies on average. Finally, the probability that a
voting failure within any frame occurs is
7∑
i=4
0.00479i = 5.28808 ∗ 10−10
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 275 274
2 268 268
3 301 298
4 258 256
5 282 280
6 273 272
7 262 260
8 265 265
9 290 289
10 271 270
11 299 298
12 268 268
13 242 241
14 259 258
15 265 262
Average 271.8667 270.6000
Expected 274.8737 274.2215
Table 5.10: Simulation results for scenario 3 with ideal-world setting
meaning that every 26.4 years a voting failure will occur. Table 5.10 shows the
results of the simulation.
For predicting the real-world scenario, we have to recalculate the time nec-
essary to replace an RC. The upload bandwidth of an RC is 131072Bytes/s, so
within a frame an RC can upload 131072Bytes/s ∗ 440ms = 57672Bytes. For
sending the state message, per frame 57672Bytes− 34000Bytes = 23672Bytes
remain and the sending of the state takes
1024Bytes ∗ 100
23672Bytes/Frame
= 4.326
frames on average. Since we did not change the number of Region Controllers,
there are still eighteen RCs that need to be replaced of which ten percent crash.
We end up with 18 ∗ 4.326 + 5.4 = 83.268 additional inconsistencies.
Table 5.11 shows the results of the simulation. The probability of a Region
Controller being inconsistent per frame is 349.13338179∗7 = 0.00809. The probability
of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00610i = 1.39132 ∗ 10−9
and results in one voting failure in 10.3 years on average.
5.7.3 Scenario 4 - 50 MBit VDSL Node, 100 Game Clients
Our last two scenarios make use of so-called VDSL (which stands for Very
High Speed Digital Subscriber Line) nodes. They are already available in major
German cities and provide a downstream of up to 50MBit/s and a downstream
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 253 336
2 282 362
3 255 337
4 284 367
5 265 346
6 282 363
7 263 345
8 281 362
9 265 347
10 245 327
11 253 336
12 278 359
13 271 353
14 297 377
15 238 320
Average 267.4667 349.1333
Expected 274.8737 357.4895
Table 5.11: Simulation results for scenario 3 with real-world setting
of up to 10MBit/s. In this scenario we investigate how the system performs on
faster connections using the same number of nodes as in the last scenario.
Number of GCs per Region 100
Maximum number of RCs 7
Node download bandwidth 50 MBit/s
Node upload bandwidth 10 MBit/s
GC Request Size 60 Bytes
RC Update Size 300 Bytes
RC processing time 100 ms
Buffer time 35ms
Node location Germany
Simulation length 17643 Frames
For the sending of requests, our model yields
7 ∗ 100Bytes
10MBit/s
=
700Bytes
1310720Bytes/s
= 0.00053s
for the upload and
100 ∗ 100Bytes
50MBit/s
=
10000Bytes
6553600Bytes/s
= 0.00153s
for the download. For the sending of updates, we get
100 ∗ 340Bytes
10MBit/s
=
34000Bytes
1310720Bytes/s
= 0.02594s
and
7 ∗ 340Bytes
50MBit/s
=
2380Bytes
6553600Bytes/s
= 0.00130s
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 617 616
2 584 584
3 569 569
4 576 574
5 610 606
6 546 543
7 545 544
8 575 572
9 615 613
10 596 596
11 552 549
12 584 580
13 607 606
14 559 559
15 588 587
Average 581.5333 579.8667
Expected 581.3415 579.9891
Table 5.12: Simulation results for scenario 4 with ideal-world setting
respectively. For the first time, the download link of a Region Controller is the
limiting factor for the request phase. However, the difference for the rounded
transmission times is only one millisecond. As before, the upload link of an RC
limits the sending of updates. For the frame length we get
(2ms+ 35ms+ 3ms) + 100ms+ (26ms+ 35ms+ 3ms) = 204ms
The probability for any single request to arrive in time is
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (40− (i ∗ 0.00153)− 3);µ, σ)
7
= 0.999953
so on average 581.3415 requests will be too late. The probability for any Region
Controller being inconsistent in a frame is
1− 0.999953100 = 0.00470
so we get 579.9891 inconsistencies on average. Finally, the probability that a
voting failure within any frame occurs is
7∑
i=4
0.00479i = 4.88699 ∗ 10−10
meaning that every 13.2 years a voting failure will occur. Compared to the last
scenario, the shorter frames length incurred by the faster connections of the
nodes lead to a shorter mean time between a voting failure. Table 5.12 shows
the results of the simulation.
We now calculate the time needed to replace an active Region Controller.
The upload bandwidth of an RC is 1310720Bytes/s, so within a frame an RC
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 601 614
2 597 611
3 569 582
4 589 599
5 576 587
6 531 545
7 588 600
8 610 621
9 567 580
10 548 559
11 588 600
12 575 588
13 542 556
14 573 584
15 563 576
Average 574.4667 586.8000
Expected 581.3415 593.2911
Table 5.13: Simulation results for scenario 4 with real-world setting
can upload 1310720Bytes/s ∗ 204ms = 267387Bytes. For sending the state
message, per frame 267387Bytes− 34000Bytes = 233387Bytes remain and the
sending of the state takes
1024Bytes ∗ 100
233387Bytes/Frame
= 0.439
frames on average. Thus, we end up with 18 ∗ 0.439 + 5.4 = 13.302 additional
inconsistencies.
Table 5.13 shows the results of the simulation. The probability of a Region
Controller being inconsistent per frame is 586.817643∗7 = 0.00475. The probability
of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00475i = 5.12091 ∗ 10−10
and results in one voting failure in 12.6 years on average.
5.7.4 Scenario 5 - 50 MBit VDSL Node, 250 Game Clients
For our last scenario, we use the same VDSL nodes as in the last scenario, but
extend the number of Game Clients per region to 250. Because of the higher
number of GCs, we increase the buffer time again by 10ms.
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Number of GCs per Region 250
Maximum number of RCs 7
Node download bandwidth 50 MBit/s
Node upload bandwidth 10 MBit/s
GC Request Size 60 Bytes
RC Update Size 300 Bytes
RC processing time 100 ms
Buffer time 45ms
Node location Germany
Simulation length 13580 Frames
For the sending of requests, our model yields
7 ∗ 100Bytes
10MBit/s
=
700Bytes
1310720Bytes/s
= 0.00053s
for the upload and
250 ∗ 100Bytes
50MBit/s
=
25000Bytes
6553600Bytes/s
= 0.00381s
for the download. For the sending of updates, we get
250 ∗ 340Bytes
10MBit/s
=
85000Bytes
1310720Bytes/s
= 0.06485s
and
7 ∗ 340Bytes
50MBit/s
=
2380Bytes
6553600Bytes/s
= 0.00130s
respectively. As in the last scenario, the download link of a Region Controller
is the limiting factor for the request phase and the upload link of an RC limits
the sending of updates. For the frame length we get
(4ms+ 45ms+ 3ms) + 100ms+ (65ms+ 45ms+ 3ms) = 265ms
The probability for any single request to arrive in time is
P (InT imem) =
∑n
i=1 f2(2 ∗ (52− (i ∗ 0.00152)− 3);µ, σ)
7
= 0.999984
so on average 370.2597 requests will be too late. The probability for any Region
Controller being inconsistent in a frame is
1− 0.999984250 = 0.00389
so we get 369.5424 inconsistencies on average. Finally, the probability that a
voting failure within any frame occurs is
7∑
i=4
0.00389i = 2.29275 ∗ 10−10
meaning that every 36.7 years a voting failure will occur. Compared to the last
scenario, the shorter frames length incurred by the faster connections of the
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 366 366
2 374 373
3 370 368
4 354 353
5 345 342
6 375 374
7 383 381
8 363 363
9 401 400
10 369 368
11 393 389
12 389 386
13 354 352
14 351 350
15 362 359
Average 369.9333 368.2667
Expected 370.2597 369.5424
Table 5.14: Simulation results for scenario 5 with ideal-world setting
nodes lead to a shorter mean time between a voting failure. Table 5.14 shows
the results of the simulation.
We now calculate the time needed to replace an active Region Controller.
The upload bandwidth of an RC is 1310720Bytes/s, so within a frame an RC
can upload 1310720Bytes/s ∗ 265ms = 347341Bytes. For sending the state
message, per frame 347341Bytes− 85000Bytes = 262341Bytes remain and the
sending of the state takes
1024Bytes ∗ 100
262341Bytes/Frame
= 0.390
frames on average. Thus, we end up with 18 ∗ 0.390 + 5.4 = 12.420 additional
inconsistencies.
Table 5.15 shows the results of the simulation. The probability of a Region
Controller being inconsistent per frame is 376.266713580∗7 = 0.00396. The probability
of a voting failure per frame is
7∑
i=4
0.00396i = 2.46442 ∗ 10−10
and results in one voting failure in 26.2 years on average.
5.8 Results
In this section, we recapitulate the results of our calculations and the simu-
lation runs. We start with the results for the different extensions of our first
scenario which are shown in table 5.16. The table contains the expected num-
ber of inconsistencies determined by our analytical model, the average number
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Simulation Run Delayed Requests RC Inconsistencies
1 369 382
2 382 395
3 387 399
4 363 378
5 345 356
6 380 394
7 357 369
8 354 366
9 338 352
10 395 407
11 381 395
12 338 352
13 359 372
14 337 352
15 361 375
Average 363.0667 376.2667
Expected 370.2597 381.9624
Table 5.15: Simulation results for scenario 5 with real-world setting
Scenario Expected Inc. Average Inc. Error MTBVF
ideal 179.0142 178.7333 0.0016 88.0
clock skew 179.0142 181.1333 0.0117 84.1
churn 286.6776 279.8667 0.0243 14.7
crashes 292.0776 288.6667 0.0118 13.0
combined 292.0776 290.3333 0.0060 12.7
Table 5.16: Results of the different extensions of scenario 1
of inconsistencies from the simulation runs, the error of the simulation results
compared to the analytical results and the mean time between voting failures
in years (MTBVF).
As we can see, the difference between the model and the simulation results is
very low, at most 2.43 percent. Especially in the ideal-world scenario, the model
very precisely predicts the average of the simulation results. The error slightly
increases in the clock skew scenario, since the analytical model was not adapted
to this extension. Only for the churn and crash extensions the model was also
enhanced. Here it shows the largest deviations from the simulation results, but
still the difference remains very low. For the most interesting scenario, the
combination of all extensions, the error decreases again. However, when looking
at the higher errors of the other real-world scenarios, this small error seems to
be just coincidental.
For the ideal-world setting, we can expect just a single voting failure within
88 years of playing. Even the addition of clock skew doesn’t change this signif-
icantly. However, as node churn comes into play, the probability of an voting
failures increases considerably. Although the number of inconsistencies only
increases by approximately 65 percent, the MTBVF drops to less than 18 per-
cent. As expected, adding node crashes and clock skew further lowers the MT-
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Scenario Expected Inc. Average Inc. Error MTBVF
1 292.0776 290.3333 0.0060 12.7
2a 960.5635 943.2667 0.0183 1.6
2b 459.6892 450.8000 0.0197 24.7
3 357.4895 349.1333 0.0239 10.3
4 593.2911 586.8000 0.0111 12.6
5 381.9624 376.2667 0.0151 26.2
Table 5.17: Results for the real-life scenarios
BVF. Compared to the significant decrease caused by adding node churn, these
changes are rather small.
Table 5.17 shows the results for all real-life scenarios in the same format.
The highest error that occurs is still below 2.5 percent, showing that our ana-
lytical model is very precise. Looking at the mean time between voting failures
shows an interesting fact. Scenario 2a (the one with the 20ms buffer) uses
the same settings as scenario 1, only the higher bandwidth leads to a shorter
frame length (216ms instead of 520ms). Reducing the frame length by the
factor 2.41 multiplies the number of inconsistencies by 3.25 and the MTBVF
even decreases by the factor 7.94. This clearly shows, that if we just reduce
the frame length proportionally to the additional bandwidth, this may lead to
a significantly higher chance of a voting failure. In scenario 2b, which uses just
a slightly larger buffer time of 25ms instead of 20ms, the situation is reversed.
Due to the rather small buffer extension, the MTBFV is even twice as high as
in scenario 1. Consequently, the buffer is raised in the following scenarios to
35ms and 45ms respectively. The MTBVF stays between 10.3 and 26.2 years,
which we consider very acceptable.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have evaluated whether the approach presented in the pre-
vious chapter is feasible in a realistic setting. For this purpose, we developed
an analytical model that allows us to determine the number of inconsistencies
and the mean time between voting failures according to a range of parameters
like the bandwidth of the player nodes, the number of Game Clients and Region
Controllers and the length of a frame. To verify the results of the model, we
implemented the system using a simulation framework. We simulated five differ-
ent scenarios with realistic parameters and took the average of fifteen simulation
runs per scenario. The results of the simulation runs show that the analytical
model gives a rather precise prediction of the average simulation results. Fur-
thermore, they show that our approach can be realized on player nodes that use
currently available Internet connections.
A shortcoming of our model is that one cannot directly calculate the neces-
sary buffer times for given scenario parameters and a desired mean time between
voting failures. In order to do so, we would need the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of the log-normal distribution. Unfortunately, no simple
analytical closed form of this function exists. However, the model can be used
to approximate buffer sizes that ensure that the probability of a voting failures
stays within certain bounds.
Chapter 6
Summary and Future Work
In this thesis we presented a novel network architecture for multiplayer online
games that reduces the costs for providing online game services significantly by
utilizing available computational and bandwidth resources on the customers’
computers. Additionally, we evaluated whether the proposed architecture is
suitable for real-life scenarios. Finally, we embedded this architecture into a de-
velopment framework that reduces complexity while at the same time enhances
reusability.
Chapter 3 presents the framework that provides a game developer with a
complete abstraction from network related issues. With network implementa-
tion details hidden, game developers can focus more on game design rather than
writing specialized code. Implementation details like data-driven game objects
further emphasize this approach. The framework consists of three layers which
hide the details of the respective lower layers. Usually, a regular game devel-
oper will only get in touch with the highest layer, the game layer. On this
layer, standard components, like the game engine and components managing
audiovisual feedback and player input, are located. The modular design allows
to easily replace components with custom or off-the-shelf ones. This is also the
place where the rules and the logic of a specific game are implemented. All
components on this layer communicate with the layer below, the object layer.
The object layer makes access to remote objects completely transparent. Since
consistency and ownership management are handled automatically, game devel-
opers can create, manipulate and delete all game objects as if they were local.
The lowest layer, the networking layer, hides all network related issues behind
a Publish/Subscribe abstraction. If necessary, this layer can be customized for
different quality requirements, like higher scalability or lower latency.
In chapter 4 we presented a Peer-to-Peer gaming system that distributes the
management of game state and logic among the nodes of the players. This way
it utilizes unused computing time and bandwidth on the players’ computers
and relieves the game publisher’s servers of resource intensive tasks. Storing
the game state on player nodes makes it vulnerable for being manipulated by
malicious nodes. By not trusting a single node for managing the correct state
but replicating it on multiple nodes we counteract tampering. Because there
may now exist multiple dissenting versions of the game state, the correct one is
determined by a majority voting. Since player nodes are not powerful enough to
handle the complete state of the game world, it is split into smaller sized regions.
105
106 CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
A single player node only manages a replica of a region which is assigned to the
node by a central trusted service. This service is also responsible for handling
sensitive player information, like subscription and credit card data.
In chapter 5 we provided a detailed evaluation of the network architecture
proposed in the previous chapter. We developed an analytical model that allows
us to determine the number of inconsistencies and the mean time between vot-
ing failures according to a range of parameters like the bandwidth of the player
nodes, the number of Game Clients and Region Controllers and the length of
a frame. The model was verified against a implementation of the system using
a simulation framework. We evaluated five different scenarios with realistic pa-
rameters. For each scenario we performed fifteen simulation runs and compared
the average to our model. The results of the simulation runs show that the ana-
lytical model gives a rather precise prediction of the average simulation results.
Furthermore, they show that our approach can be realized on player nodes that
use currently available Internet connections.
6.1 Future Work
Many multiplayer online games are session-based, i.e. the game runs only for a
limited amount of time. E.g. a First-Person-Shooter deathmatch session may
be started and runs for twenty minutes. Players may join and leave at any
time during the session. At the end, the score for each remaining player is
determined. On the contrary, a session of a Real-Time-Strategy game is started
and runs until one of the players wins. Usually, no new players may join the
session and nobody should leave.
For session-based games, persistence is not an issue. However, for Massively
Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) which usually have persistent worlds, the
situation is different. The ”session” starts when the game is launched and is
closed probably years later when the game service is discontinued. During this
time, players may accumulate plenty of virtual achievements and possessions.
The state of such persistent game worlds should be regularly written to persis-
tent storage. This is necessary in case the system completely crashes or needs
to be shut down for maintenance purposes. Moreover, if a region of the game
world is currently empty, i.e. there are no avatars in it, the region can be shut
down and the corresponding RCs can go back to the pool of free RCs.
In order to create a snapshot of the current region state, all RCs of that
region send the changes since the last backup to a persistence service. It deter-
mines the correct state by choosing the one which holds the majority. Every
time a player leaves, his avatar’s data can be sent to the persistent service.
Whenever he joins again, his data can directly be sent to the responsible RCs.
This makes it unnecessary for RCs to store data of avatars which are currently
not in the game. The persistence service may be provided by the game hoster
or could be itself a P2P-based system running on players’ nodes. [89]
There are also still opportunities for future research in detecting and perse-
cuting cheating attacks. One is the implementation of a log auditing service [59]
which enables the system to detect certain kind of attacks (see section 4.5) which
cannot be prevented in the first place. The idea is that each node of the system
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keeps a log of all received messages for a certain period. Since all messages in
our system are required to be signed, it is possible to prove the origin of each
message. Whenever a node detects a cheating attack, it can request an inves-
tigation of the case by a trusted authority. Fur this purpose, it sends a digest
of the received messages (including their signatures) to the trusted authority
which can analyze the messages. If an attack has been detected, appropriate
measures can be taken.
Another opportunity for future work is the challenge of how to deal with
omitted messages as described in section 4.5.4. As we have shown, a malicious
node cannot gain unfair advantages from omitting messages. However, it can
cause Region Controllers to go out-of-sync and thus degrade player experience.
The problem is, that neither the sender can prove that it sent a message nor the
receiver can prove that it did not receive a message. If the underlying network
provided some reliable multicast mechanism that inserts a list of all recipients
into every message, at least the honest recipients can prove that a certain node
was omitted. This way clients that omit only certain Region Controllers from
their requests can be detected. Another possibility would be the use of repu-
tation systems [57]. Whenever a node does not receive a required message it
may report the omitting node to the reputation service. This way, a long-term
estimation about the trustworthiness of nodes can be achieved.
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